Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Zhang, Chao <chao.b.zh...@intel.com>
---
SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 1404 +++++++++++++++++---
.../Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h | 73 +
.../Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c | 110 +-
.../Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf | 4 +
.../DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 670 +++++++++-
5 files changed, 1935 insertions(+), 326 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
index 1f9ba15..86ea04b 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
@@ -56,6 +56,56 @@ EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {
{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }
};
+//
+// Secure Boot Mode state machine
+//
+SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {
+ // USER MODE
+ {
+ TRUE, // IsPkExist
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode
+ FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode
is RW
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
+ FALSE, // IsDeployedModeRO,
DeployedMode is RW
+ SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode
+ // SetupMode is always RO
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot
+ },
+ // SETUP MODE
+ {
+ FALSE, // IsPkExist
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode
+ FALSE, // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode
is RW
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
+ TRUE, // IsDeployedModeRO,
DeployedMode is RO
+ SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode
+ // SetupMode is always RO
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot
+ },
+ // AUDIT MODE
+ {
+ FALSE, // IsPkExist
+ AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE, // AuditMode
+ TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO,
AuditMode is RO
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE, // DeployedMode
+ TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO,
DeployedMode is RO
+ SETUP_MODE_ENABLE, // SetupMode
+ // SetupMode is always RO
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE // SecureBoot
+ },
+ // DEPLOYED MODE
+ {
+ TRUE, // IsPkExist
+ AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE, // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO
+ TRUE, // AuditModeValAttr RO
+ DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE, // DeployedMode
+ TRUE, // DeployedModeValAttr RO,
DeployedMode is RO
+ SETUP_MODE_DISABLE, // SetupMode
+ // SetupMode is always RO
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE // SecureBoot
+ }
+};
+
/**
Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.
@@ -173,80 +223,988 @@ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithMonotonicCount (
AuthVariableInfo.PubKeyIndex = KeyIndex;
AuthVariableInfo.MonotonicCount = MonotonicCount;
- return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
- &AuthVariableInfo
- );
+ return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
+ &AuthVariableInfo
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Update the variable region with Variable information.
+
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.
+ @param[in] Data Data pointer.
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
+ @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
+ @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
+ @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
+ IN VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataSize,
+ IN UINT32 Attributes,
+ IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS FindStatus;
+ VOID *OrgData;
+ UINTN OrgDataSize;
+ AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
+
+ FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ &OrgData,
+ &OrgDataSize
+ );
+
+ //
+ // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable
+ //
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) !=
0)) {
+ if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {
+ //
+ // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall
not perform an append of
+ // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing
variable value.
+ //
+ FilterSignatureList (
+ OrgData,
+ OrgDataSize,
+ Data,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
+ AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;
+ AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;
+ AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;
+ AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;
+ AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;
+ AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;
+ return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
+ &AuthVariableInfo
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Initialize Secure Boot variables.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+InitSecureBootVariables (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT32 SecureBoot;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE SecureBootMode;
+ BOOLEAN IsPkPresent;
+
+ //
+ // Find "PK" variable
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ IsPkPresent = FALSE;
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n",
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
+ } else {
+ IsPkPresent = TRUE;
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.
+ // Initial case
+ // SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state
+ // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync
+ // 1.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
+ // 1.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
+ // 1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode
Var
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ //
+ // Variable driver Initial Case
+ //
+ if (IsPkPresent) {
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;
+ } else {
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync
+ //
+ SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;
+ ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);
+
+ if (IsPkPresent) {
+ //
+ // 3.1 Add PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
+ //
+ if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;
+ } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var
+ // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK -> system break -> Update
SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode
+ //
+ if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode ==
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
+ SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {
+ //
+ // Update SecureBootMode Var
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootModeGuid,
+ &SecureBootMode,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Init "AuditMode"
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Init "DeployedMode"
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Init "SetupMode"
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,
+ sizeof(UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed
Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
+ // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot"
variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ if (!IsPkPresent) {
+ //
+ // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before
reboot
+ // Delete "SecureBootMode"
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ 0,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ } else {
+ SecureBootEnable = *Data;
+ }
+ } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode
== SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
+ //
+ // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed
Mode.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
+ //
+ if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE)
+ && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode ==
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {
+ SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
+ } else {
+ SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
+ }
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBoot,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
SecureBoot));
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
SecureBootEnable));
+
+ //
+ // Save SecureBootMode in global space
+ //
+ mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Update SecureBootMode variable.
+
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+UpdateSecureBootMode(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ //
+ // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootModeGuid,
+ &NewMode,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ );
+
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot
mode transition
+ to a new mode.
+
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+TransitionFromAuditMode(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable
maintained by Variable driver
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &AuditVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &DeployedVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SetupVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due
to NV range overflow.
+ // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.
+ //
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
+ }
+
+ if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
+ //
+ // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in
memory
+ //
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0
+ //
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could
avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+ //
+ // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+ //
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could
avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is
operating
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
+ // Variable in runtime.
+ //
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ //
+ // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ sizeof (SecureBootEnable),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ } else {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n",
SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot
mode transition
+ to a new mode.
+
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+TransitionFromDeployedMode(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable
maintained by Variable driver
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &DeployedVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SetupVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due
to NV range overflow.
+ // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.
+ //
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
+ }
+
+ switch(NewMode) {
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
+ //
+ // DeployedMode ----> UserMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // DeployedMode := 0
+ //
+ // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and
no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
+ //
+ // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update
SecureBootMode in memory
+ //
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ //
+ // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode
+ //
+ // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub
+ // Side Effects
+ // DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0
+ //
+ // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+ //
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is
operating
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change
SecureBoot
+ // Variable in runtime.
+ //
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ //
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ 0,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n",
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot
mode transition
+ to a new mode.
+
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+TransitionFromUserMode(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;
+ UINT8 *DeployedVarData;
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;
+ UINT8 *PkVarData;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry;
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable
maintained by Variable driver
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &AuditVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &DeployedVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SetupVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due
to NV range overflow.
+ // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is
assumed to be always successful.
+ //
+ if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var
first.
+ // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic
+ //
+ VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);
+ VariableEntry.Guid = &gEfiSecureBootModeGuid;
+ VariableEntry.Name = EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME;
+ if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency
(VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch(NewMode) {
+ case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:
+ //
+ // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before.
rollback this transition
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // UserMode ----> DeployedMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // DeployedMode := 1
+ //
+ CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
+ //
+ // UserMode ----> AuditMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0
+ //
+ // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.
+ //
+ PkVarData = NULL;
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ PkVarData,
+ 0,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n",
Status));
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable
+ //
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ //
+ // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update
other variable.
+ //
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n",
Status));
+ }
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ //
+ // Fall into SetupMode logic
+ //
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
+ //
+ // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update
SecureBootMode in memory
+ //
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ //
+ // UserMode ----> SetupMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0
+ //
+ // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is
operating
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change
SecureBoot
+ // Variable in runtime.
+ //
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ //
+ // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ 0,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n",
SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot
mode transition
+ to a new mode.
+
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+TransitionFromSetupMode(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *AuditVarData;
+ UINT8 *SetupVarData;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootVarData;
+ UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable
maintained by Variable driver
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &AuditVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SetupVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &SecureBootVarData,
+ &DataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC
+ // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due
to NV range overflow.
+ // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is
assumed to be always successful.
+ //
+ Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));
+ }
+
+ switch(NewMode) {
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
+ //
+ // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before.
rollback this transition
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // SetupMode ----> AuditMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // AuditMode := 1
+ //
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
+ //
+ // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update
SecureBootMode in memory
+ //
+ mSecureBootMode = NewMode;
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ //
+ // SetupMode ----> UserMode
+ // Side Effects
+ // SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1
+ //
+ // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
+ //
+ // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is
operating
+ // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change
SecureBoot
+ // Variable in runtime.
+ //
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this
could avoid possible
+ // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot,
sizeof(UINT8));
+
+ //
+ // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
+ //
+ SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
+ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ &SecureBootEnable,
+ sizeof (SecureBootEnable),
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n",
SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
}
/**
- Update the variable region with Variable information.
+ This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.
- @param[in] VariableName Name of variable.
- @param[in] VendorGuid Guid of variable.
- @param[in] Data Data pointer.
- @param[in] DataSize Size of Data.
- @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable.
- @param[in] TimeStamp Value of associated TimeStamp.
+ @param[in] CurMode Current Secure Boot Mode.
+ @param[in] NewMode New Secure Boot Mode.
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The update operation is success.
- @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is write-protected.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.
**/
EFI_STATUS
-AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
- IN VOID *Data,
- IN UINTN DataSize,
- IN UINT32 Attributes,
- IN EFI_TIME *TimeStamp
+SecureBootModeTransition(
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE CurMode,
+ IN SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE NewMode
)
{
- EFI_STATUS FindStatus;
- VOID *OrgData;
- UINTN OrgDataSize;
- AUTH_VARIABLE_INFO AuthVariableInfo;
-
- FindStatus = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- &OrgData,
- &OrgDataSize
- );
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
//
- // EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute only effects for existing variable
+ // SecureBootMode transition
//
- if (!EFI_ERROR (FindStatus) && ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) !=
0)) {
- if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
- ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
- (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||
- (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {
- //
- // For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver shall
not perform an append of
- // EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing
variable value.
- //
- FilterSignatureList (
- OrgData,
- OrgDataSize,
- Data,
- &DataSize
- );
- }
+ switch (CurMode) {
+ case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:
+ Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:
+ Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:
+ Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);
+ break;
+
+ case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:
+ Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
}
- ZeroMem (&AuthVariableInfo, sizeof (AuthVariableInfo));
- AuthVariableInfo.VariableName = VariableName;
- AuthVariableInfo.VendorGuid = VendorGuid;
- AuthVariableInfo.Data = Data;
- AuthVariableInfo.DataSize = DataSize;
- AuthVariableInfo.Attributes = Attributes;
- AuthVariableInfo.TimeStamp = TimeStamp;
- return mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable (
- &AuthVariableInfo
- );
+ return Status;
+
}
/**
@@ -597,129 +1555,6 @@ Done:
}
}
-/**
- Update platform mode.
-
- @param[in] Mode SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.
-
- @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @return EFI_SUCCESS Update platform mode successfully.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-UpdatePlatformMode (
- IN UINT32 Mode
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- VOID *Data;
- UINTN DataSize;
- UINT8 SecureBootMode;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
- UINTN VariableDataSize;
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Data,
- &DataSize
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could
avoid possible
- // variable storage reclaim at runtime.
- //
- mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
- CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
-
- if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {
- //
- // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating
- // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot
- // Variable in runtime.
- //
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing
verification,
- // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Data,
- &DataSize
- );
- //
- // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.
- // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.
- // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
- } else {
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
- } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
- } else {
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
- }
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- //
- // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable
secure boot feature.
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &Data,
- &DataSize
- );
-
- if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {
- //
- // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
- VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);
- } else {
- //
- // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as
"SecureBoot"
- // variable is not in secure boot state.
- //
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
- VariableDataSize = 0;
- }
-
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- VariableDataSize,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- return Status;
-}
/**
Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for
PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.
@@ -880,6 +1715,121 @@ VendorKeyIsModified (
}
/**
+ Process Secure Boot Mode variable.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external
input.
+ This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
+ This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security
issues, like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+ This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
+
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+ @param[in] Data Data pointer.
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less
than the
+ data, this value contains the
required size.
+ @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
+
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter
+ @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the
validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
+ @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation
successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+ProcessSecureBootModeVar (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
+ IN VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataSize,
+ IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *VarData;
+ UINTN VarDataSize;
+
+ //
+ // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes
+ // if in Runtime, Always RO
+ // if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode
+ //
+ if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Delete not OK
+ //
+ if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
+ if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW
+ //
+ if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode !=
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
+ if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {
+ return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable
maintained by Variable driver
+ // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.
+ //
+ Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ &VarData,
+ &VarDataSize
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ ASSERT(FALSE);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return
EFI_SUCCESS
+ //
+ if (*VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Perform SecureBootMode transition
+ //
+ if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode
%x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);
+ } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {
+ if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
+ //
+ // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() &&
UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before
+ //
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode
%x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode
%x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));
+ return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+/**
Process variable with platform key for verification.
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
@@ -917,6 +1867,7 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
BOOLEAN Del;
UINT8 *Payload;
UINTN PayloadSize;
+ VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY VariableEntry[2];
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0)
{
@@ -927,13 +1878,29 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
+ //
+ // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check
+ //
Del = FALSE;
- if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE
&& !IsPk)) {
- Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
- PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
- if (PayloadSize == 0) {
- Del = TRUE;
- }
+ Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
+ PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);
+ if (PayloadSize == 0) {
+ Del = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.
+ //
+ VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;
+ VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;
+ VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;
+
+ VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);
+ VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEfiSecureBootModeGuid;
+ VariableEntry[1].Name = EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME;
+
+ if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) ||
+ (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode ==
SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {
Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload,
PayloadSize);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
@@ -952,10 +1919,19 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
return Status;
}
- if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {
+ if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode
!= SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
}
- } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
+ } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode
== SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {
+ //
+ // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only
+ // if update / add PKub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"
+ //
+ if ((IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency
(VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL))
+ || (IsPk && !Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency
(VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL))) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
//
// Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.
//
@@ -970,8 +1946,19 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
);
} else {
//
+ // SetupMode or AuditMode to add PK
// Verify against the certificate in data payload.
//
+ //
+ // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency
+ //
+ if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency
(VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {
+ //
+ // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.
+ //
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
@@ -984,16 +1971,30 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
}
if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {
- if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {
- //
- // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.
- //
- Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);
- } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){
- //
- // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.
- //
- Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);
+ //
+ // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change
+ //
+ if (!Del) {
+ if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {
+ //
+ // If enroll PK in setup mode, change to user mode.
+ //
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);
+ } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {
+ //
+ // If enroll PK in Audit mode, change to Deployed mode.
+ //
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode
change.\n", mSecureBootMode));
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode
== SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {
+ //
+ // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode, change to Setup Mode.
+ //
+ Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode,
SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);
+ }
}
}
@@ -1046,7 +2047,8 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
}
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() &&
UserPhysicalPresent())) {
+ if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode ==
SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)
+ && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {
//
// Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.
//
@@ -1083,7 +2085,7 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
return Status;
}
- if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {
+ if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode
!= SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {
Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();
}
}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
index add05c2..88f3a99 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
@@ -117,6 +117,33 @@ typedef struct {
} AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA;
#pragma pack()
+///
+/// "SecureBootMode" variable stores current secure boot mode.
+/// The value type is SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE.
+///
+#define EFI_SECURE_MODE_NAME L"SecureBootMode"
+
+typedef enum {
+ SecureBootModeTypeUserMode,
+ SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode,
+ SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode,
+ SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode,
+ SecureBootModeTypeMax
+} SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE;
+
+typedef struct {
+ BOOLEAN IsPkExist;
+ UINT8 AuditMode;
+ BOOLEAN IsAuditModeRO;
+ UINT8 DeployedMode;
+ BOOLEAN IsDeployedModeRO;
+ UINT8 SetupMode;
+ //
+ // SetupMode is always RO. Skip IsSetupModeRO;
+ //
+ UINT8 SecureBoot;
+} SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
+
extern UINT8 *mPubKeyStore;
extern UINT32 mPubKeyNumber;
extern UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;
@@ -129,6 +156,19 @@ extern UINT8 mVendorKeyState;
extern VOID *mHashCtx;
extern AUTH_VAR_LIB_CONTEXT_IN *mAuthVarLibContextIn;
+extern SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;
+
+/**
+ Initialize Secure Boot variables.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The initialization operation is successful.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There is not enough resource.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+InitSecureBootVariables (
+ VOID
+ );
/**
Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set
@@ -220,6 +260,39 @@ FilterSignatureList (
);
/**
+ Process Secure Boot Mode variable.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external
input.
+ This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.
+ This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security
issues, like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+ This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.
+
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be found.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+ @param[in] Data Data pointer.
+ @param[in] DataSize Size of Data found. If size is less
than the
+ data, this value contains the
required size.
+ @param[in] Attributes Attribute value of the variable
+
+ @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter
+ @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the
validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
+ @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Variable is Read-Only.
+ @return EFI_SUCCESS Variable passed validation
successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+ProcessSecureBootModeVar (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
+ IN VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataSize,
+ IN UINT32 Attributes OPTIONAL
+ );
+
+/**
Process variable with platform key for verification.
Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
index a54eaaa..446b07c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ UINT32 mMaxKeyNumber;
UINT32 mMaxKeyDbSize;
UINT8 *mCertDbStore;
UINT32 mMaxCertDbSize;
-UINT32 mPlatformMode;
UINT8 mVendorKeyState;
+SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE mSecureBootMode;
EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID,
EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};
@@ -99,6 +99,17 @@ VARIABLE_ENTRY_PROPERTY mAuthVarEntry[] = {
MAX_UINTN
}
},
+ {
+ &gEfiSecureBootModeGuid,
+ L"SecureBootMode",
+ {
+ VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_REVISION,
+ VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY,
+ VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ sizeof (UINT8)
+ }
+ }
};
VOID **mAuthVarAddressPointer[10];
@@ -132,8 +143,6 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
UINT8 *Data;
UINTN DataSize;
UINTN CtxSize;
- UINT8 SecureBootMode;
- UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
UINT8 CustomMode;
UINT32 ListSize;
@@ -208,31 +217,11 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));
}
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n",
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
- } else {
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
- }
-
//
- // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
+ // Init Secure Boot variables
//
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
- } else {
- mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
- }
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &mPlatformMode,
- sizeof(UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
+ Status = InitSecureBootVariables ();
+
//
// Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
@@ -249,69 +238,6 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
}
//
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set
"SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.
- // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot"
variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;
- Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);
- if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE){
- //
- // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before
reboot
- // Delete "SecureBootMode" in SetupMode
- //
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- 0,
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- } else {
- SecureBootEnable = *(UINT8 *) Data;
- }
- } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
- //
- // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.
- //
- SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
- &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
- &SecureBootEnable,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
- }
-
- //
- // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
- //
- if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
- } else {
- SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
- }
- Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (
- EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &SecureBootMode,
- sizeof (UINT8),
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- );
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return Status;
- }
-
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
mPlatformMode));
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
SecureBootMode));
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
SecureBootEnable));
-
- //
// Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.
//
CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
@@ -455,10 +381,16 @@ AuthVariableLibProcessVariable (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
+ //
+ // Process PK, KEK, Sigdb, AuditMode, DeployedMode separately.
+ //
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
Attributes, TRUE);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
Attributes, FALSE);
+ } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)
+ && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0 || StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0)) {
+ Status = ProcessSecureBootModeVar(VariableName, VendorGuid, Data,
DataSize, Attributes);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
index 3709f7b..3cf6582 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"AuthVarKeyDatabase"
gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid
+ ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"
+ ## PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"
+ gEfiSecureBootModeGuid
+
gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID
for the type of the certificate.
gEfiCertPkcs7Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID
for the type of the certificate.
gEfiCertX509Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID
for the type of the signature.
diff --git
a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 5cb9f81..4b4d3bf 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -712,6 +712,58 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
}
/**
+ Create signature list based on input signature data and certificate type
GUID. Caller is reposible
+ to free new created SignatureList.
+
+ @param[in] SignatureData Signature data in SignatureList.
+ @param[in] SignatureDataSize Signature data size.
+ @param[in] CertType Certificate Type.
+ @param[out] SignatureList Created SignatureList.
+ @param[out] SignatureListSize Created SignatureListSize.
+
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The operation is failed due to lack of
resources.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully create signature list.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+CreateSignatureList(
+ IN UINT8 *SignatureData,
+ IN UINTN SignatureDataSize,
+ IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **SignatureList,
+ OUT UINTN *SignatureListSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignList;
+ UINTN SignListSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
+
+ SignList = NULL;
+ *SignatureList = NULL;
+
+ SignListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ SignatureDataSize;
+ SignList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignListSize);
+ if (SignList == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ SignList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ SignList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignListSize;
+ SignList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) SignatureDataSize + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1;
+ CopyMem (&SignList->SignatureType, CertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
+
+ DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SignatureDataSize %x\n", SignatureDataSize));
+ Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, SignatureData, SignatureDataSize);
+
+ *SignatureList = SignList;
+ *SignatureListSize = SignListSize;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
+/**
Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system
configuration table.
@param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware
regarding this image.
@@ -737,11 +789,13 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;
UINTN NameStringLen;
UINTN DevicePathSize;
+ CHAR16 *NameStr;
ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;
NameStringLen = 0;
+ NameStr = NULL;
if (DevicePath == NULL) {
return ;
@@ -769,7 +823,12 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
}
DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);
- NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) +
NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;
+
+ //
+ // Signature size can be odd. Pad after signature to ensure next
EXECUTION_INFO entry align
+ //
+ NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen
+ DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;
+
NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *)
AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
if (NewImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {
return ;
@@ -788,19 +847,21 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ImageExeInfoEntry, Action);
WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof
(EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)), (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
+ NameStr = (CHAR16 *)(ImageExeInfoEntry + 1);
if (Name != NULL) {
- CopyMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)
+ sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, Name, NameStringLen);
} else {
- ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION)
+ sizeof (UINT32), sizeof (CHAR16));
+ ZeroMem ((UINT8 *) NameStr, sizeof (CHAR16));
}
+
CopyMem (
- (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) + sizeof
(UINT32) + NameStringLen,
+ (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen,
DevicePath,
DevicePathSize
);
if (Signature != NULL) {
CopyMem (
- (UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoEntry + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION) +
sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,
+ (UINT8 *) NameStr + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,
Signature,
SignatureSize
);
@@ -1088,6 +1149,53 @@ IsTimeZero (
}
/**
+ Record multiple certificate list & verification state of a verified image to
+ IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
+
+ @param[in] CertBuf Certificate list buffer.
+ @param[in] CertBufLength Certificate list buffer.
+ @param[in] Action Certificate list action to be record.
+ @param[in] ImageName Image name.
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath Image device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ IN UINT8 *CertBuf,
+ IN UINTN CertBufLength,
+ IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 CertNumber;
+ UINT8 *CertPtr;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT8 *Cert;
+ UINTN CertSize;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;
+
+ CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuf);
+ CertPtr = CertBuf + 1;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {
+ CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);
+ Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);
+
+ //
+ // Record all cert in cert chain to be passed
+ //
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(Cert, CertSize, &gEfiCertX509Guid,
&SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, ImageName, ImageDevicePath, SignatureList,
SignatureListSize);
+ FreePool (SignatureList);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also
earlier than
the revocation time.
@@ -1197,8 +1305,11 @@ Done:
Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database
(dbx).
The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked
before signing time.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved
from the signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature
retrieved from the signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+ @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in
AuditMode.
+ @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
@retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
@retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
@@ -1206,8 +1317,11 @@ Done:
**/
BOOLEAN
IsForbiddenByDbx (
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -1230,7 +1344,10 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
UINT8 *Cert;
UINTN CertSize;
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
-
+ UINT8 *SignerCert;
+ UINTN SignerCertLength;
+ UINT8 *UnchainCert;
+ UINTN UnchainCertLength;
//
// Variable Initialization
//
@@ -1245,6 +1362,10 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
BufferLength = 0;
TrustedCert = NULL;
TrustedCertLength = 0;
+ SignerCert = NULL;
+ SignerCertLength = 0;
+ UnchainCert = NULL;
+ UnchainCertLength = 0;
//
// The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
@@ -1352,21 +1473,54 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
}
Done:
+ if (IsForbidden && IsAuditMode) {
+ Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength,
&UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);
+
+ //
+ // Record all certs in image to be failed
+ //
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ SignerCert,
+ SignerCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ UnchainCert,
+ UnchainCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
if (Data != NULL) {
FreePool (Data);
}
Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);
Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);
return IsForbidden;
}
+
/**
Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted
certificates in DB database.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved
from signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature
retrieved from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in
bytes.
+ @param[in] IsAuditMode Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in
AuditMode.
+ @param[in] ImageName Name of the image to verify.
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath DevicePath of the image to verify.
@retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
@retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
@@ -1374,14 +1528,17 @@ Done:
**/
BOOLEAN
IsAllowedByDb (
- IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN IsAuditMode,
+ IN CHAR16 *ImageName OPTIONAL,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
- EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;
UINTN DataSize;
UINT8 *Data;
UINT8 *RootCert;
@@ -1391,14 +1548,22 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
UINTN DbxDataSize;
UINT8 *DbxData;
EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
+ UINT8 *SignerCert;
+ UINTN SignerCertLength;
+ UINT8 *UnchainCert;
+ UINTN UnchainCertLength;
- Data = NULL;
- CertList = NULL;
- Cert = NULL;
- RootCert = NULL;
- DbxData = NULL;
- RootCertSize = 0;
- VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ Data = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ CertData = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ DbxData = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ SignerCert = NULL;
+ SignerCertLength = 0;
+ UnchainCert = NULL;
+ UnchainCertLength = 0;
DataSize = 0;
Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
@@ -1419,14 +1584,14 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) -
CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) -
CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
//
// Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
//
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCert = CertData->SignatureData;
RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
//
@@ -1468,7 +1633,7 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
goto Done;
}
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert +
CertList->SignatureSize);
+ CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData +
CertList->SignatureSize);
}
}
@@ -1478,10 +1643,67 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
}
Done:
+
if (VerifyStatus) {
- SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);
+ SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);
+ }
+
+ if (IsAuditMode) {
+
+ Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength,
&UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);
+ if (VerifyStatus) {
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
+ //
+ // Record all cert in signer's cert chain to be passed
+ //
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ SignerCert,
+ SignerCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
+ //
+ // Record all certs in unchained certificates lists to be failed
+ //
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ UnchainCert,
+ UnchainCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Record all certs in image to be failed
+ //
+ if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ SignerCert,
+ SignerCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+
+ if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {
+ RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(
+ UnchainCert,
+ UnchainCertLength,
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,
+ ImageName,
+ ImageDevicePath
+ );
+ }
+ }
}
+
if (Data != NULL) {
FreePool (Data);
}
@@ -1489,10 +1711,370 @@ Done:
FreePool (DbxData);
}
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);
+
return VerifyStatus;
}
/**
+ Provide verification service for signed images in AuditMode, which include
both signature validation
+ and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI
WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
+ MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
+
+ In this implementation, only verify external executables when in AuditMode.
+ Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
Other authentication status
+ are record into IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.
+
+ The image verification policy is:
+ If the image is signed,
+ At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image
must match a record
+ in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value
of the image may
+ be reflected in the security database "dbx".
+ Otherwise, the image is not signed,
+ The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database
"db", and
+ not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data
structure
+ within this image buffer before use.
+
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
+ This is the authentication status returned from the
security
+ measurement services for the input file.
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file
that is
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for
logging.
+ @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
+ @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device
path.
+ @param[in] BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage()
UEFI service.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The authenticate info is sucessfully stored
for the file
+ specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
FileBuffer
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did
not
+ authenticate, and the platform policy
dictates that the DXE
+ Foundation many not use File.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+ImageVerificationInAuditMode (
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,
+ IN UINTN FileSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
+ UINT32 Policy;
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
+ UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *WinCertUefiGuid;
+ UINT8 *AuthData;
+ UINTN AuthDataSize;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir;
+ UINT32 OffSet;
+ CHAR16 *FilePathStr;
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;
+
+ SignatureList = NULL;
+ WinCertificate = NULL;
+ SecDataDir = NULL;
+ PkcsCertData = NULL;
+ FilePathStr = NULL;
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+
+ //
+ // Check the image type and get policy setting.
+ //
+ switch (GetImageType (File)) {
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
+ Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
+ //
+ if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get Image Device Path Str
+ //
+ FilePathStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);
+
+ //
+ // Authentication failed because of (unspecified) firmware security policy
+ //
+ if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {
+ //
+ // No signature, record FilePath/FilePathStr only
+ //
+ AddImageExeInfo (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED, FilePathStr, File, NULL, 0);
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
+ // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
+ //
+ ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy !=
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);
+ if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy ==
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ CpuDeadLoop ();
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Read the Dos header.
+ //
+ if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+ mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
+ mImageSize = FileSize;
+
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE)
DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;
+
+ //
+ // Get information about the image being loaded
+ //
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
+ //
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
+ //
+ // DOS image header is present,
+ // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
+ //
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
+ } else {
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check PE/COFF image.
+ //
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase +
mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
+ //
+ // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 &&
mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic
value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is
EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
+ //
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
+ //
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ }
+
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)
&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ NumberOfRvaAndSizes =
mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
+ if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
+ SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)
&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Start Image Validation.
+ //
+ if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {
+ //
+ // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record
in the security database "db",
+ // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
+ //
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).
+ //
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest,
&mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).
+ //
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest,
&mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Add HASH digest for image without signature
+ //
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType,
&SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList,
SignatureListSize);
+ FreePool (SignatureList);
+ }
+ goto END;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per
PE/COFF Section 4.7
+ // "Attribute Certificate Table".
+ // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from
the start of the file.
+ //
+ for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;
+ OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);
+ OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE
(WinCertificate->dwLength))) {
+ WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);
+ if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof
(WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <
WinCertificate->dwLength) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7
signed data is supported.
+ //
+ if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+ //
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is
described in the
+ // Authenticode specification.
+ //
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;
+ if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData;
+ AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);
+ } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {
+ //
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is
described in UEFI Spec.
+ //
+ WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;
+ if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <=
OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;
+ AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength -
OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);
+ } else {
+ if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
+
+ //
+ // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in
forbidden database (dbx).
+ // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed
database (db).
+ //
+ if (!IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File)) {
+ IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check the image's hash value.
+ //
+ if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest,
&mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest,
&mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED |
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Add HASH digest for image with signature
+ //
+ Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType,
&SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);
+
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList,
SignatureListSize);
+ FreePool (SignatureList);
+ } else {
+ goto END;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {
+ //
+ // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is
corrupted.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ } else {
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+END:
+
+ if (FilePathStr != NULL) {
+ FreePool(FilePathStr);
+ FilePathStr = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
Provide verification service for signed images, which include both
signature validation
and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI
WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
@@ -1559,7 +2141,9 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
UINT32 Policy;
- UINT8 *SecureBoot;
+ UINT8 *VarData;
+ UINT8 SecureBoot;
+ UINT8 AuditMode;
PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
UINT32 NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
@@ -1579,6 +2163,20 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);
+ //
+ // Skip verification if AuditMode variable doesn't exist. AuditMode should
always exist
+ //
+ if (VarData == NULL) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ AuditMode = *VarData;
+ FreePool(VarData);
+
+ if (AuditMode == AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE) {
+ return ImageVerificationInAuditMode(AuthenticationStatus, File,
FileBuffer, FileSize, BootPolicy);
+ }
+
//
// Check the image type and get policy setting.
//
@@ -1622,22 +2220,22 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
CpuDeadLoop ();
}
- GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);
+ GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);
//
// Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.
//
- if (SecureBoot == NULL) {
+ if (VarData == NULL) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ SecureBoot = *VarData;
+ FreePool(VarData);
//
- // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled.
+ // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode
//
- if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {
- FreePool (SecureBoot);
+ if (SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- FreePool (SecureBoot);
//
// Read the Dos header.
@@ -1808,7 +2406,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
//
// Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in
forbidden database (dbx).
//
- if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
+ if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
@@ -1818,7 +2416,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
// Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed
database (db).
//
if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
- if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
+ if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {
VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
}
