In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Alan McLean <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I am sure there is a multitude of possible answers to this one.
>One way I would answer it is to say that probability is only applicable
>to *observable* events - that is, the occurrence of something which is
>in some way directly measurable. The existence of God is not observable
>in this sense, so probability is irrelevant to any discussion about the
>existence of God.
This would exclude the application of probability to such
things as nuclear physics. While we have to use
observations to draw inferences, the probabilities of
interest are not those about the observations, but about
the underlying process.
>Another, related way to express this is to say that belief in the
>existence of God is a *model* for the universe. Within that model
>probability questions can be asked, but one cannot talk meaningfully of
>the existence of the model. (The same comment applies, for example,
>about general relativity as a theory which models the universe.)
However, we use probability methods (actually statistical)
to draw inferences not just within a model, but between
models. One mistake, however, is to treat composite
hypotheses or models as simple, as is the case here.
>Repeatability is certainly (oops! - with high probability) not a
>prerequisite for probability to make sense.
This is very definitely the case.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
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