Chers collègues,

J'ai le plaisir de vous annoncer que Javier Cumpa (Université complutense
de Madrid) donnera une conférence au Collège de France le 17 mai prochain, dans
le cadre des activités de la chaire de Métaphysique et de Philosophie de la
Connaissance du Professeur Claudine Tiercelin.

La rencontre aura lieu à 14h, en salle 2, au RDC du bâtiment principal du
Collège de France (11 place Marcelin Berthelot, 75005 Paris).

*Javier Cumpa*
"*Naturalistic Neutralism*"
*Abstract *: According to Universalism, properties are universals because
there is a certain fundamental tie that makes properties capable of being
shareable by more than one thing. On the opposing side, Particularism is
the view that properties are particulars due to the existence of a
fundamental tie that makes properties incapable of being shared. In this paper
I argue, first, that universality and particularity can characterize a
property if and only if there is a universalist or a particularist fundamental
tie, and, second, that it is unclear that these should be the fundamental
ties that connect ordinary and scientific properties to their respective
bearers. Then I develop an alternative approach to properties and the
fundamental
tie, which is neutralist because it dispenses with universality and
particularity as features of properties,and naturalist because it naturalizes
the possession of properties by replacing metaphysical fundamental ties
with a scientific one, in particular, a physical process. I show how this
approach improves our understanding of properties and instantiation.

https://www.college-de-france.fr/media/metaphysique-philosophie-connaissance/UPL3765899303795982804_Affiche_Cumpa_17_05.pdf

Entrée libre, sans inscription préalable, dans la limite des
places disponibles.

Pour toute question, merci d'écrire à :
alexandre.dec...@college-de-france.fr


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