--- On Mon, 12/27/10, Anthony Papillion <[email protected]> wrote:
> From: Anthony Papillion <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Ekiga-list] Ekliga Encryption. > To: "Ekiga mailing list" <[email protected]> > Date: Monday, December 27, 2010, 3:03 AM > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 12/26/2010 12:03 PM, Grigory Sarnitskiy wrote: > > Hello! > > > > Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_VoIP_software) > says there is no encryption in Ekiga. I'm pretty dumb in all > that security stuff, but still I want to have some level of > encryption. How do I secure my conversations? > > I'm pretty sure the Wikipedia entry is correct, I don't > think Ekiga > encrypts at all. I've been looking for encrypted > VoIP, you might want > to look at using Phil Zimmermanns ZFone (which might be > able to be used > to secure and encrypt Ekiga traffic). > > Anthony > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32) > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJNGHJtAAoJEIeUq9QAeLbkLIEP+gLsJDvbQ4y8Kdk/DK61BywG > 0CYnxaI8NGBUSU6DS1f+dh6oyFytlMNSgWdBXNL7h9kxCpnLqU8Zldnpw/9qRfYZ > 6xOnHJhnngRvFnJZKstejvC6xSsEmNlFZPNKZDcLaI4EgbSmWhgIQz4ENMAvRHSz > IU66mmyz04ja7ZEdINUm6JRy/ADDkCHb/SG7Lm0zNMDEUC3XZLQSsAWe3mKhuEEK > hGe6PQ3oGqX2My0epnHVBLf1URj1z0clMhpoLvy0zeqkfxQN9BpgE2zeGnqan8rN > pV570ESD9kiuOUPDEmaUwzA4U+WPbba5K7MR0Vo8/KE8xKj29RWg96/ebDvY0urV > EDiJAa7O9ll0Ju15o4WEq6E1jwo5RQx8NOuzrLZ5sdaWrO1bGjOXvAcJc0eqQI/F > 7bzW/TnlSka+whmHv6JWU3GrvCwofLOsyn1PTNzgLVfjY9Q3F44vit/vci5FAxrv > L5nBfmcgmDmbC9++wnlK0tJ7PbunYB+iJaJE/7TgydtyfD9UguEmfl2MxFdpKtQa > 7vcG0pkDKFSa1I7zOErXZXISXAb81wKKwIjStCsFw5DFBuPKoArIdtl/cGecYuyC > Bk3hX7tfD2Qst3mLeZRMf8NsgtXfWuwadFgm/fmZD1C8kxSOYR+T/vD4Gggh7TY1 > v3rBuLaO4MHHsLNF+IAu > =5aU5 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > ekiga-list mailing list > [email protected] > http://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/ekiga-list > I suggest to read http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP and pay special attention to: " To ensure that the attacker is indeed not present in the first session (when no shared secrets exist), the Short Authentication String method is used: the communicating parties verbally cross-check a shared value displayed at both endpoints. If the values don't match, a man-in-the-middle attack is indicated. (In late 2006, NSA developed an experimental voice analysis and synthesis system to defeat this protection.[2]) " ;-) . Regards, Sergei. _______________________________________________ ekiga-list mailing list [email protected] http://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/ekiga-list
