On 9/13/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
I'll start looking for a BeatpathWinner FBC failure example, but I hope
others will too, because it isn't so easy to find one.
There was an FBC failure example posted recently. It arises from a cycle with a lot of sincere indifference. It goes like this:
31% C>A>B
9% B>C>A
28% B=C>A
32% A>B>C
68% C > 32% A
63% A > 37% B
41% B > 31% C
Consider the 32% A>B>C faction. It takes 12% (38% of the faction) of them to win the election for B by "strong" favorite betrayal (B>A>C), making B the Condorcet winner. They can win the election for B by "weak" favorite betrayal (A=B>C) if 22% (69% of the faction) vote that way, but they have incentive for reversal unless they know for sure that that many will act in a similar fashion.
In my opinion, a method where favorite betrayal scenarios are restricted to a very narrow range of situations are not a major problem. If the polls start to look something like this, voters will know well in advance. In the vast majority of situations, there is no incentive to bury your favorite.
Forest has argued recently (with regards to DMC, but the argument still applies here) that voters will be very reluctant to vote full favorite betrayal unless they know for certain that it is necessary. This runs contrary to what Mike suggest, which is that voters will reverse order unless they are absolutely sure it is *not* necessary. Ultimately it is very hard for any of us to predict what effect wv Condorcet voting would have on the political climate and people's attitudes toward voting.
-Adam
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