On Sun, 2005-09-18 at 03:15 +0200, Kevin Venzke wrote: > --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet > > winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is > > violated, there's a good chance that one person, one vote has been > > violated. > > > I will be willing to bet that there's some element of this problem in > > any FBC complying method. > > What about Minmax(pairwise opposition), in which the winner is the candidate > for whom the greatest number of votes against him in any contest is the > smallest such score among all candidates? > > The change necessary to permit my ICA method to satisfy FBC sacrifices > Condorcet hardly at all. > > This is Condorcet: > "If there is one candidate who beats all the others, he must win." > > ICA satisfies this: > "If there is one candidate who doesn't lose to any others after certain losses > are disregarded (due to being reversible by voters using equal-top ranking), > he must win." > > ICA scales Condorcet back only as far as is necessary to satisfy FBC.
Hi Kevin, Let's take a look at the example posted on the ICA page on Electowiki ( http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ICA ) (probably your example): 40 A>B 35 A=B 25 B The head-to-head pairwise score in this election is 40-25 (35 abstain). I don't like the idea of inferring that all of these voters "approved" of B to declare B the winner. Those 40 voters would rightfully expect that "A>B" be the same as saying "A", and would feel ripped off that their 40 votes actually counted both for and against A in the A-B comparison. They might also complain one person, one vote has been violated, since their 40 votes for A over B don't count for as much as the 25 votes for B over A. Actually, the 40 votes don't count at all. My understanding based on your previous descriptions of ICA is that explicit approval is problematic in ICA, since there's a lot of gaming that can be done below the cut line. All things considered, I'm not sure how this doesn't count as "favorite betrayal". A voters gave the election away by "approving" B. Their favorite (A) lost the election as the result of a lower ranking. Rob ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
