Kevin,I strongly agree with this.--- Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :We could discuss whether insincere equal ranking for top is more dishonest or whether approving one more candidate is more dishonest...In my opinion, insincere equal ranking is more insincere than approving an additional candidate. I've seen one definition that says that as long as the voter sincerely prefers all the candidates s/he approves to all the ones s/he doesn't,"Sincere approval voting" isn't even clearly defined. then the "approval vote" is sincere. To me this is mainly a bit of sophistry for the purpose of promoting Approval. This is my proposed clear definition: "An 'approval vote' is one that makes some approval distinction among the candidates. It is sincere if (1)the voter sincerely prefers all the approved candidates (or single candidate) to all the not approved candidates (or single candidate), and (2) it is how the voter would vote without any knowledge or guess as to how other voters might vote." By this definition, DMC (like IRV and unlike WV) meets "No Zero-Information Strategy". No method can make it impossible for well-informed strategists to sometimes have an advantage, but it irks me that WV has non-obvious fairly sophisticated strategy for "zero-information" voters (random-fill and if you have a big ratings gap, equal-rank above it). Chris Benham |
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