Kevin,I don't have a big problem with plain Approval satisfying NZIS. Of course Approval is promoted as a--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :This is my proposed clear definition: "An 'approval vote' is one that makes some approval distinction among the candidates. It is sincere if (1)the voter sincerely prefers all the approved candidates (or single candidate) to all the not approved candidates (or single candidate), and (2) it is how the voter would vote without any knowledge or guess as to how other voters might vote."I have trouble with (2). We could assume that "how the voter would vote" means optimal, above-mean approval strategy. But obviously that is a problem for a definition of "sincerity." It would also make approval satisfy NZIS. method that invites voters to strategize. If , by some absolute standard in the voter's mind, the voter sincerely "approves" at least one but not all of the candidatesOtherwise we could choose to not define "how the voter would vote." But in that case nothing prevents a strategically unwise vote from being sincere, so that I don't see how DMC could satisfy NZIS. then "sincere approval" is clearcut. I suppose if this isn't the case then as you say if we leave undefined "how the voter would vote" there is still 0-info. approval strategy (so plain Approval doesn't really meet NZIS). It seems clear that DMC has no zero-info. *ranking* strategy. (Is that what you meant?) But unless we define "sincere approval"You would have to claim that DMC has no zero-info approval strategy. as "optimal zero-information approval ('strategy')", then DMC perhaps doesn't fully meet NZIS. Chris Benham |
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