All of this notwithstanding, no one has ever explained to me how including an extraneous "+" is different from
my_preferred>all_others_could_live_with>>those I think would save me some problems by having a heart attack. I repeat, if I can say A+=B> then you shold be able to infer that from that me saying A>B>>(all others). The "plus" added to a ranked ballot is unnecessary, but it could turn an approval ballot into a semi-ranked ballot. If that is desirable, just use a ranked ballot to begin with. > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ] On Behalf Of Abd ulRahman Lomax > Sent: Friday, September 30, 2005 9:40 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] RE: [Condorcet] A "Condorcet" by any other > name stillsmells as sweet? > > At 06:46 PM 9/30/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote: > > >Approval is unacceptable to voter psychology because once you > >approve Compromise, you erase the ballot distinction between > >Favorite and Compromise. That's why ordinary Approval is not a > >viable ballot proposal. > > This is the main objection I have seen to Approval, other than the > phoney one that Approval allegedly gives one voter more than one vote. > > >What does that leave? > > > >1. Creative use of simple ballots to get voter rankings, as (for > >example) in Jobst's DFC proposal. > > > >2. Ranked or not, ballots have to allow distinction of Favorite > >without strong incentive to rate or rank Compromise with the > >distinctive mark along with (or in place of) Favorite. This means > >that the distinctive mark has to be mostly expressive or symbolic, > >with very weak instrumentality, such as having a role in > breaking ties. > > > >After Asset Voting, Approval Plus (A+) is the simplest such > a proposal. > > Depending on how it is implemented, A+ is actually a Condorcet > method.... But Forest does not go there with it. The Condorcet > variation I've called A+PW, PW standing for pairwise. > > >Approval Plus is Approval with the ability to distinguish one > >candidate with a plus. > > It is Approval "plus" specification of a Favorite. The word > "Approval" does cause some problems. Some people think that it is > insincere to "Approve" a candidate who you can barely stand, merely > because he or she is a frontrunner and is not as bad as the other. So > I've switched the names to > > Favorite, Preferred, [blank = Not Preferred] > > There is no reason to prohibit the designation of more than one as > Favorite, but most voters won't do it. The reason *not* to prohibit > it is simply that it does no harm. > > >Along with the approval tally, there is a tally of each > candidate's plusses. > > > >When the max approval candidate is unique, that candidate is elected. > > The max approval candidate will so rarely not be unique that we could > practically neglect the possibility and leave the resolution to > existing law, which might be a coin toss. However, one could use the > Favorite information to resolve a tie, and I see no reason to > resort to: > > >When two or more candidates are tied for max approval, then the plus > >tally for each candidate is used to determine how many marbles will > >correspond to that candidate in an urn full of different colored > >marbles (one color for each candidate). > > > >A marble is drawn. The candidate owning the drawn marble picks the > >winner from among the tied candidates. > > However, the Favorite (Plus) information could be actually used, in > more ways than one. First of all, I've never seen Approval advocates > (other than myself) mention it, but Approval has a problem when mated > with public campaign finance laws. What happens when you approve two > candidates? If you are a Nader voter, is the public funding resulting > from your Green vote split with the Democrats? > > However, Plus solves this problem. Campaign financing would be > determined by the Plus votes. Plus also solves the psychological > problem of being unable to specify a favorite. > > However, in basic A+, one problem remains. When there is a two-party > system and the chances of a third party winning are vanishingly > small, basic Approval solves the spoiler problem (as does any > Condorcet method). However, as a third party approaches parity, the > spoiler problem will loom again. If there are three parties, about > equal in voting strength as seen in polls going into the election, a > voter who has a strong preference will have a difficult choice: vote > for only the Favorite and thus abstain from the pairwise election > between the two other candidates, or vote for the Favorite and a > Preferred, and abstain from *that* pairwise election. > > Plus suggests a possible path: Use the Favorite information in the > pairwise contest between any Favorite and Preferred candidate. This > must be done ballot-wise, it can't just be totals, I think. > Essentially, this is Condorcet, with only three ranks allowed. > > Because it is a Condorcet method, it should be vulnerable to cycles. > But, by its nature, it has clear Approval information, which can be > used to resolve cycles. I think that the DMC method could be used, > but I prefer simply awarding the election to the Approval winner > among the members of a cycle. > > I have *not* examined all the implications of this proposal. There > have been other attempts to suggest methods using a similar ballot, > but I have not yet found an existing proposal that analyzes the > ballots in the same way. It seems simple to me, and obvious, but I > didn't think of it until a few days ago, and it *may* be that somehow > this procedure was overlooked. > > It is an Approval method. And it is a Condorcet method, but with > limited ranking. > > I think it is worthy of examination, and this is happening to some > degree on the EM list. As I have written many times, I don't consider > myself an expert..... > > I have come to realize this, though: much of the concern over > strategic voting may be misplaced. Strategic voting, by definition, > risks a failure to elect a preferred candidate just as much as it may > result in a supposedly better outcome. Strategic voting can be > employed by more than one group. I think that it would actually be > rare that an attempt would even be made. So simply noting that a > method is vulnerable to some strategy may not be fatal to the method. > I'm much more concerned about the possibility that, with sincere > voting, Condorcet failure may occur *without* the compensating fact > that the Approval winner was elected. > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
