At 12:31 AM 10/4/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Normalization only works if there's not a third candidate forcing the distortion (e.g. candidate "C"):
That is correct. Range Voting requires the same kind of strategic consideration as Approval Voting, a vote is diluted if cast at less than 100%
90 voters: A=10, B=9, C=0 10 voters: B=10, A=0, C=whatever A: 900 B: 910 Once again B wins, but this time, the presence of information about C prevents normalization. In essence, normalized range violates the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion (IIAC).
Yes. Normalization only increases the relative strength so that the voters' vote is not diluted and becomes equivalent to a plurality vote for the favorite(s). (This presumes that the favorite has the highest range vote.)
There is, I think, a common misconception about Range, perhaps because of the association with sports scoring.
A sincere Range Vote is not an opinion about the candidate, properly. It is an expression of the voter's desire, or lack of same, to avoid disappointment by the election of an unacceptable candidate, while, at the same time, to maximize the possibility of the election of a favorite.
This requires, in Range, the use of standard Approval strategy, which is to give the maximum rating to the favorite, and if the favorite is not a front-runner, to the preferred frontrunner, and to all candidates equally acceptable or preferred to the front-runner. Failing to follow this strategy is an act by the voter which weakens the voter's vote. If the strategy is followed, the voter is then free to give weaker ratings to other candidates, especially those whom the voter would not terribly mind seeing elected.
The allegedly shocking example was one where the great majority of voters did not follow this strategy, at least not with the reported votes. It is correct that there might have been other votes not shown because they were "irrelevant," perhaps those majority voters who preferred A to B by a one-point margin actually did not have A as favorites. In this case, yes, normalization would not have helped. It would help in the case where voters really think all the candidates poor and want to express that, but still want to influence the outcome of the election. Or else they could simply have stayed home.
In that example, the A voters expressed a weak preference. Thus it is utterly unsurprising that B could win through other voters expressing a strong preference. As Mr. Smith might point out, this is a feature, not a bug. If you care strongly, express a strong preference! Range allows you to do that, it does not *require* you to do that, as does plurality and basic Approval, with binary preference allowed only.
Range is an Approval Method, and one should vote it as Approval or suffer a dilution of one's vote. Range *allows* the voter to make votes indicating a weak preference. That is an increase in the freedom of the voter.
It makes it appear that the method with normalization suffers from a failure to satisfy IIAC. Normalization considers the overall voting pattern, so other votes are *not* irrelevant in the same way as they would be in a ranked system.
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