Warren Smith (Wed.Oct.5):wds: Robla failed to mention that range voting *does* obey a weakened form of the majority-winner criterion (call it "WMW"). Specifically: "If a strict majority of the voters regard X as their unique favorite, then they, acting alone without regard to what the other voters do, can force his election." I don't know about you, but I personally regard WMW as a more-desirable critrion for a voting system to obey, than Anderson 1994's MW criterion.Chris Benham: Are there any methods actually *fail* this criterion? Borda perhaps?--response by wds: yes, Borda fails it. So does the somewhat Borda-like method used on the Island of Nauru. So does Coombs' IRV-like voting method. Also Ken Arrow's favorite voting method (or so I heard) the Arrow-Raynaud method, fails this test.Range voting, however, passes this test. wds Warren, I've seen Coombs defined with and without a majority-stopping rule. (To me not having it seems worse and odd). I assume you are referring to the version without: http://cec.wustl.edu/~rhl1/rbvote/desc.html The candidate with the largest last-rank total is eliminated. The last-rank totals are recalculated and the step repeated until only one remains.The other version seems more common: http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Coombs%27_method BTW, do you know for sure that one of these definitions is incorrect? Obviously the version with the stopping-rule meets your WMW criterion. I am sure that "Arrow-Raynaud" is the same as plain "Raynaud" (sometimes spelt "Reynaud") which is a method that meets the Condorcet criterion. What according to you is its definition, and can you give an example of it failing your WMW criterion? Chris Benham |
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