Sorry Mike, I should have said "I don't see the purpose of the criterion," rather than "the value of.." The question was a matter of clarity, not of value. Rob Lanphier kindly clarified the criterion in another posting (thanks Rob!), so my response here will be limited. I see now that the SFC applies to strict majorities only.
I do want to discuss the issue of "sincerity" a little further however. I had written "it doesn't matter if the reason for the votes was honest, strategic, or if the voter's mothers told them what to do." From your response it seems I need to clarify this statement. If we're talking about just one profile (yes, one set of votes), then what I said was true. Of course, a criterion might then validly apply a constraint against what is strategically possible with manipulation of the votes (creating another profile in the process that has a defined loser or winner). But I don't see that in the SFC definition, so there doesn't appear to be a reason for the sincerity constraint. Stated another way, one man's garbage is another man's treasure, or in this case, one man's strategically generated ballot set is another man's honest one. If you give me a set of "strategic" ballots, I'll give it back to you as a sincere one. Finally, to correct myself, it's not true that both the original SFC wording & the revised one are both Smith criteria for strict majorities as I'd said. Instead, the original SFC wording is a weakened Condorcet criteria & it's the revised one that appears to be the weakened Smith. Here it is again: > On 10/5/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Any sincere-voting majority is guaranteed that no one whom they all like > > less than the CW will win. Thanks, -Ken ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
