All of the gobblydegoog aside, to Rob - we don't care what you want, us voters want to NOT have to rank all altertantives. I want to list only the ones I find acceptable in the order I prefer them. Any method that "encourages" me to rank all alterntatives whether I know anything about them or care about them will just encourage me to not vote.
> -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF > Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 8:50 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [EM] Re: Rob: MDDA vs BeatpathWinner > > > Rob-- > > You wrote: > > The one major objection I have [to MDDA] is the lack of > truncation resistance - I really hope we can find a system that > encourages a full ranking. It seems that MDDA would tend to > discourage > ranking anyone below a plausible frontrunner, if I understand it > correctly. > > I reply: > > Not necessarily. For the person who needs and wants to make > use of FBC > compliance, then yes, that person will equal-top-rank the > acceptables, and > power truncate the unacceptables. If power truncation isn't > available, then > s/he will truncate them or rank them in reverse order of winnability. > > Likewise, s/he'd sometimes rank the unacceptables in reverse order of > winnability in BeatpathWinner, if offensive-order-reversal > deterrence isn't > the primary consideration. S/he must judge if offensive > order-reversal is a > threat, and, based on that, whether to truncate or > strategically rank. With > MDDA there similarly would be a choice between truncation and > strategic > ranking. Truncate if you think you can best beat all the > unacceptables in > the Approval count. Strategically rank if you think you can > best beat them > all by making majority defeats against eachother. With power > truncation you > don't have that concern: Just power truncate them. Much simpler than > BeatpathWinner or unenhanced MDDA). > > But I'm saying that SFC compliance is for the person who > doesn't need FBC, > for the sincere voter. If you believe you're in a > sincere-voting majority, > then you can freely rank all the candidates, and you're > assured that no one > that your majority like less than the CW will win. That > doesn't require any > truncation, or any kind of strategy. > > So it isn't that MDDA forces you to truncate. It depends on which > criterion-compliance you want to use, which kind of strategy > you want to > use, what kind of a voter you are. The two kinds of strategy, > the mix of > criterion-compliances, makes MDDA more versatile than BeatpathWinner. > > You continued: > > I'd also really like to rename SFC to something that is more > descriptive > of what's measured. If a system encourages truncation, it can't > truthfully be called "strategy free". > > I reply: > > I haven't named MDDA "Strategy-Free". When Kevin devised and > introduced > MDDA, we agreed on the name MDDA. > > But MDDA is indeed strategy-free for a majority with the > conditions and goal > described in SFC. SFC describes condidtions under which a > majority can > ensure that no one worse than the CW wins, without using any > strategy, with > complying methods. So yes, SFC is about strategy-freeness, where it's > possible. > > > Such subjective titles don't > serve us well anyway. "Majority Pairwise Winner" would be an accurate > and suitable name, but certainly not the only one. > > I reply: > > The words strategy-free describe SFC's guarantee. > Strategy-freeness where > it's possible. > > You continued: > > I've contemplated > "Majority Condorcet Winner", but using "Condorcet" in the name isn't > helpful, since I don't think Condorcet ever proposed anything > like that. > > I reply: > > That Condorcet didn't propose SFC, or a name for it, doesn't > mean that it > wouldn't be appropriate to name SFC for its protection of CWs, or its > relation to the Condorcet Criterion. > > I sometimes refer to SFC as Condorcet's Criterion for > majorities. And I > sometimes refer to GSFC as the Smith Criterion for majorities. > > I have no objection to those names in the paragraph before > this one. If > others prefer them, I'd be glad to use them. Then, I'd capitalize > "Majorities", so the criteria would be "Condorcet's Criterion for > Majorities" and "The Smith Criterion for Majorities". > > But I feel that "Strategy-Free Criterion" describes what > makes them the > pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting. > > Mike Ossipoff > > _________________________________________________________________ > Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today > - it's FREE! > http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/ > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
