-------- Original Message --------
| Subject: | re:[EM] Approval-completed Condorcet redux |
|---|---|
| Date: | Mon, 07 Jul 2003 06:12:40 +0930 |
| From: | Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> |
| To: | [EMAIL PROTECTED] |
Sorry, when I first tried to sugest this method (in a posting on Mon. July 7,2003),
I left out a step.
After much thought, this is my very serious proposal for the best version of Approval-completed Condorcet for public elections. Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an Approval cutoff, default is between 1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each candidate is also ok, with default being Yes to all the number ones and No to the rest.) If any candidates are approved by a majority, eliminate the rest. Of the remaining, elect the CW if there is one. If not,eliminate all non- members of the Smith set and also the Smith set member with the fewest approvals.Of the remaining, elect the CW is there is one.If not then eliminate the remaining candidate with the fewest approvals, and so on. "When the car gets stuck in the mud, make the horse do as little work as it has to to pull the car out. Don't just abandon the car and jump on the horse!" The car in my metaphor represents the Condorcet method, and the horse represents the Approval method. One of the main reasons for the first step (eliminating candidates not approved by a majority)is to get voters to take the Approval cutoff seriously.
Chris Benham.
