"A recent example from James Green-Armytage (Sun. 17-8-03).
46: A>B>C
44: B>C>A
05: C>A>B
05: C>B>A
According to James, his 44 BCA voters are insincerely order-reversing (trying a Burial strategy) against A, and their sincere preferences are BAC, which makes A the sincere pairwise beats-all Condorcet winner.
IGB (100 voters)
Round 1: A:46 B:44 C:10
Round 2: A:51 B:95 C:54
A is eliminated, all ballots have been counted towards B or C, so B is first finalist."
The first part of the last sentence is wrong. I somehow failed to notice that
all the candidates, not just B and C, have a majority. In that circumstance,
just as in plain Bucklin, the candidate with the highest tally just wins.
In reference to this example:
31: B>A>E>C>D
23: C>B>A>E>D
25: D>A>C>E>B
11: D>C>B>A>E
10: E>A>C>B>D
100 voters, the Smith set is ABC.
On Thursday,August 21, 2003 Eric Gorr wrote:
"This example contains a simple cycle between ABC. It is clear that DE are not preferred over ABC by any majority and shouldn't have the possibility of winning.
So, the question becomes, who should be victorious in the cycle. I cannot come up with any good reason to believe that should be anyone other then A."
Eric, for this observation to be especially relevant,I assume that you CAN
"come up with a good reason to believe" that A should win. What reason might that be?
Chris Benham
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