49% A>B>C 12% B>A>C 12% B>C>A 27% C>B>A
The 49% can get A elected by truncating in margins.
In winning votes, the truncation has no effect.
-Adam
At 01:24 AM 9/10/2003 -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
In the past, several people sent me some examples where a week condorcet winner could get his victory stolen by some strategical truncation behavior...
I was able to generate a family of problems to do so even with Ranked Pair (winning votes) at the time:
11+2X votes: -------------- 2+X : A 2 : A > B > C 2 : B > A > C 1+X : B > C > A 4: C
A is the Condorcet winner. The two B > A > C voters can get B elected by truncation, voting only B.
Adam and Alex had the same kind of example, even more obvious for margin (and relative margin). Could anyone send me some again?
Thanks, Stephane.
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