Forest, --- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit : > Suppose you were given a set of voted CR ballots, perhaps with > supplemental information such as a tentative approval cutoff. What rule > would you use to adjust the approval cutoff by taking into account the > popularity of the various candidates as manifested by the ballots > themselves, as opposed to published opinion polls?
This isn't very creative, but my thought is that if we possess all the relative ranking information (we could have the absolute rating information, as well, so long as we care about preserving majority rule more than maximum utility), and we let the voters use that information, we're going to come up with the CW. What your Max Power method does in the three-candidate, weak centrist scenario is a perfect example of this: The low-utility centrist will be embraced as soon as a major faction "learns" they can't win. (With "RWE," I found that if the voters rank down to and including the CW -or- the candidate who would've won if the CW hadn't run, whichever of the two is ranked higher, the CW still always wins. Maybe that's a predictable result, though?) When there are cycles, I think there's necessarily a game of chicken going on among the voters. I think an approval measurement is the best way to resolve the game, forcing voters to pick sides without "perfect" polling info. A defect is that there's the possibility that not all voters give approval votes with relevance to the cycle... For instance, if someone disapproved all cycle participants, or none of them, then he doesn't participate in resolving the cycle. Maybe CR is a good resolution to this defect? Once we have a cycle, all cycle participants have similar odds (don't they?), so it's a trivial task to convert a CR ballot to an approval ballot: Approve everyone preferred to the average CR score of cycle participants. Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
