These are the kinds of creative forays that I like to see. Keep it up long enough and you're going to hit on the winning combination!
On Sun, 14 Sep 2003, Chris Benham wrote: > 1.CR ballots, voters give each candidate a score out of 100 ( or any > other round number that is much greater than the number of candidates.) > 2. Inferring the rankings from the ratings, elect the CW is there is > one. If not, then eliminate the non-members of the Smith set. > > 3.Those ballots which show as many preference-levels among the remaining > candidates as there are remaining candidates (N) are now converted to > ballots showing (N-1) preferences by disregarding the smallest gap in > the scores of adjacently ranked remaining candidates. If there is a tie > for "smallest gap" , then disregard the tied gap between the highest > adjacent preferences among the remaining candidates. > > 4. Inferring rankings from these ballots (amended so that none show more > than N-1 preference-levels), elect the CW if there is one. If not , > eliminate non-members of the Smith set, repeat step 3 and so on. > > An equivalent version which is easier to hand-count but less natural and > more awkward to vote is to have the voters rank the candidates and also > rank the the gaps in utility between the adjacently-ranked candidates, > from largest to smallest. > > This is currently my favourite "high-resolution CR-ballot" single-winner > method. I think it should comply with Participation, and > probably have fewer and/or less serious strategy problems than plain > ranked-ballot Condorcet. > > Chris Benham > > > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
