Kevin Venzke a �crit :
> Markus gives this example in his paper: > 11 AB > 7 B > 12 C > > According to Plurality, A must not be elected. Monotonicity may not be sufficient > here, because of the role B may play in deciding the winner. Another example where, even with no Condorcet winner, no truncating or over-ranking stategies can benefit any of the blocks of voters when using ranked pair with winning-votes on an extended graph... 11: A > B > Z > C 7: B > Z > A ? C 12: C > Z > A ? B A > B : 11 > 7 C > A : 12 > 11 Z > A : 19 > 11 B > C : 18 > 12 B > Z : 18 > 12 Z > C : 18 > 12 Result: B > Z > C > A (only A > B does not lock) 11 or less : A (truncated) or 12 or less: C > A (over-ranked) are of no benefit compared to sincere preferences. Steph ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
