Here are some messages that might be of interest: Forest proposes the method (MCA): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9571 Alex proposes that any number of favorites be permissible: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9582 Forest agrees but expresses doubts: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9628 Joe Weinstein coins "Majority-Choice Approval," supports the unlimited version, offers some other commentary: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9692 Forest replies to this: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9707
It seems that ever since, we've favored permitting any number of favorites to be listed, because that permits MCA to meet weak FBC and clone criteria, like Approval. Could I interest anyone in reconsidering this point? It has come to be my feeling (and it seems to have been an original suspicion) that in realistic scenarios, there is little or no use for the middle rank, if any number of candidates may be "preferred." (I'll spare you the reasoning at this point.) This would be quite different if only one candidate could be preferred. We would have a method where only one candidate could be a majority favorite, which would be easier to sell, I think. Forest suggested (back then; maybe he's changed his mind) that a majority favorite would be rare, anyway. (I suspect he is or was right, though: Even in Plurality, a weak third candidate can prevent anyone from having a majority.) Who would gain from ranking Compromise as "preferred"? One who thinks Compromise could be a majority favorite, and that Compromise is better than the expected winner by greatest approval. It's true that such voters could give the election away to Compromise, but: 1. They'd be likely to do the same thing in an Approval election (that is, approve Compromise, believing Favorite is hopeless), and 2. Favorite's true approval, at least, would be revealed in the results. This does not look bad to me. What do you think? Does it seem to anyone that this method would preserve two-party rule? Is FBC too crucial to fail so clearly? Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en fran�ais ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
