On Nov 14, 2003, at 1:55 PM, David GLAUDE wrote:
I think that before any electronic system get introduced, you need to carefull set the goal and define what democratic election are.

I actually think that this is an excellent point. We may disagree about how easy a technical solution is, but I think we agree that we need to explicitly state what the requirements are.


Has anyone put together an "Electronic Voting Bill of Rights" to specify what criteria should be required of electronic voting systems? If not, I think it would be awesome if electorama could draft and ratify something like that. Touch-screen voting seems to be a hot issue, and it might generate some good publicity.

I'm sure many people here have their pet list, but I haven't seen anything systematic. Mine would include things like:

REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (EVSs)

1. MUST enable potential recounts

2. MUST be developed in an open process, allowing external accountability

3. MUST allow me to verify that my vote was entered and counted correctly

4. MUST NOT allow other people to verify that I voted a particular way

etc.

Thoughts?

-- Ernie P.


Of course, in other countries I imagine it would be quite different. But I think the more important question is whether we can reach consensus about -what- information should be available to -whom-.

My vote should only be known by me (that is the principle of a secret). I don't even trust the computer in front of me. ;-) (many ATM machine have a "web"-cam for security reason. How long until voting machine have one?


Then my vote exactly as I made it should be available (mixed and shaked with other) to the counting team... counted with whitness from each party. Then after the count, keeped securely for potential recount.

I think that before any electronic system get introduced, you need to carefull set the goal and define what democratic election are.

My definition is:
1) The vote should be secret.
2) The election result should be under citizen control (not expert control) [Where expert are the computer scientist for the state or from the vendor or ...]


If a system exclude 99.9% of the population that must trust the other 0.1% able or capable to understand the system, then we have a problem.

I had the plan to present a list of computer scientist durring the election. Then if our list get absolute majority... who will trust the result of the election.

> If we can agree on that social question, the technical problems should > be simple to resolve.

Trust me it is NOT SIMPLE at all.

Securing a system from the user might be easy.
Securing a system from the creator/operator of it (and hacker) is way much more difficult.
Making such a system transparent as election should be without compromising the secrecy of the vote make it even more difficult.


David GLAUDE

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