Chris Benham wrote:
"Later-no-harm: Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed".
In other words, if a method meets Later-no-harm then voters can never get an advantage by truncating. It is met by IRV, but is incompatible with Condorcet. I got this from what I found to be the very interesting and illuminating paper "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules" by Woodall, and uploaded by Marcus Schulze: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf
I reply:
Professor Steven Brams published an example in which IRV fails No-Later-Harm. I'd post the example, but I don't know where to look for it. You could find it just as well as I could.
Mike Ossipoff
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