Kevin, I had written:
"(Automated) Approval Margins":
High-resolution ratings ballots. Inferring ranking from rating, eliminate the non-members of the Schwartz-set.
Of the remaining candidates, each ballot approves those candidates rated above average (and half-approves those rated precisely average).
Use the (inferred) rankings to determine the results of the pairwise comparisons between the remaining candidates.
Then measure the "defeat strengths" by the differences in the candidates' approval scores. On that basis pick the Ranked Pairs winner.
You asked (Sat.Jul.3):
CB: I now find Ranked Pairs intuitive, and it is highly regarded. If I were to change my mind, I would probably go for a Woodall-likeDo you use Ranked Pairs for a particular reason?
"D min.." version. Only in the rare case of the Schwartz set having more than three members could it give a different result.
I still like Condorcet completed by picking the Approval winner, where all ranked candidates are considered approved. Offensive order reversal becomes less appealing. In exchange you get a worse LNHarm problem, but only when there is no CW.
CB: I like this better than the limited-slot methods.
CB: I'm afraid I can't take "Party List Approval" (PLA) seriously as a practical proposal. It seems a bit similar in concept to aBy the way, I think MAFP is less appealing than party list Approval now. In party list approval, the voter approves any number of lists and any number of candidates within any number of lists (approved or no), and the most approved candidate on the most approved list is elected.
set-intersection method like DAC or DSC.
Chris Benham
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