Someone wrote:
eing able to express ratings on a ballot is more expressive than only being able to express rankings. I think more expressive is a good thing.
On the back end, we could silently collapse the ratings into rankings by sorting the candidates, then apply Condorcet, IRV, etc.
I reply:
Sillently? Secretly? Letting people think they're voting ratings, and then counting them as rankings doesn't seem quite right.
You continued:
Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps in this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter and so there was no incentive to vote strategically. In a real election the stakes would be higher.
I reply:
Do you know of a nonprobablilistsic methods that isn't vulnerable to strategy, that doesn't sometimes give incentive for strategy? If so, congratulations--you've proved Gibbard & Satterthwaite wrong.
Seriously, all nonprobabilistic methods can have strategy incentive. One chooses which method's strategy incentive one wants. Some methods minimize it. For instance, Approval & Range-Voting (also called CR), never give anyone any incentive to vote someone over their favorite. No other nonprobabilistic method can make that claim.
I also defined WDSC in my previous post. Approval, CR, and wv Condorcet meet it.
Mike Ossipoff
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