Chris--
You wrote:
response to a post from James Green-Armytage, Mike Ossipoff wrote (Wed. Jan.5):
James--
You wrote:
Range voting is neither a majority rule method...
I reply:
That depends on what you mean by a majority-rule method. You define it below as a Smith-Criterion method, but you mustn't expect others to share that definition. Range-Voting, which I call CR, meets WDSC, which says:
If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y, they should have a way of voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one.
[end of WDSC definition]
In most any method a majority has the power to make some particular candidate lose. In CR (including Approval) they can do that without reversing a sincere preference.
When a majority can easily ensure the defeat of a candidate, they can enforce majority rule. CR is a majority-rule method by that reasonable standard.
CB: A slightly weaker version might dispense with the "without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one" qualification. Is your "reasonable standard" any more useful than that?
I reply:
Most definitely. Can you name a method that doesn't pass that weaker criterion?
Unless I'm mistaken on this, with any proposed method, a majority preferring X to Y has a way of voting that will make Y lose. But with Borda, that requires a knowledge of how the Y preferrers are voting, so Borda effectively fails. But with most any method, that majority can make Y lose. It's a question of what they have to do in order to accomplish that. I rate the methods by that. My criteria measure what it takes for a majority to make someone lose.
You continued:
If a method (like RV) that fails May's criterion/axiom
I reply:
I don't know what May's critrerion or axiom is, but I can predict that it probably won't be as important to me as the criteria that measure what a majority has to do in order to make someone lose. That's because I want to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, in which voters must abandon their favorite in order to make a greater-evil lose.
You continued:
, Majority Favourite
II reply:
Majority favorite is usually defined in terms of voting rather than sincere preference:
Majority Favorite (as usuallly defined in terms of voting only):
If a candidate is voted as favorite (voted over every other candidate) by a majority of the voters,s that candidate should win.
[end of Majority Favorite definition]
For instance, Plurality is usually said to meet the Majority Criterion.
Yes, I agree that it's better to define the criteria in terms of sincere preferences, and that it would be good to have a Majority Favorite version worded in terms of sincere preferences. But how would you word it?
You could say:
If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y then X should win.
that's no good, because no method meets it.
How about:
If a majority of the voters prefer X to Y, and vote sincerely, then X shouldn't win.
This last summer I stated and named that criterion. I think it's desirable, and I described a method that meets it. It's a good method, but not very decisive, because it's possible for strategists to keep preventing ilt from electing anyone. For that reason I don't propose it.
So, unless someone gives us another version of Majority Favorite that is defined in terms of sincere preference, the Majority Favorite defined in terms of actual votes only is the only one that we have, and CR (Range-Voting) passes that one. So does Approval, since Approval is a CR version.
You continued:
[If a method that fails Majority Favorite] , and Majority Loser qualifies as a "majority-rule method"; then can you tell us which methods don't?
Yes: Plurality, Instant Runoff, Borda, Margins Condorecet, and nearly all methods other than CR (including Approval), Condorcet(wv), Bucklin, ERIRV, and very few others.
Remember that "majority rule method" isn't my term. But I do have a set of majority defensive strategy criteria, so you can take your pick how much majorilty rule and strategy-freeness you want to insist on.
I claim that the basic requirement for a method that deserves to be called a "majority rule method" is that it meet WDSC, whose definition you I gave, and which you copied in your reply.
WDSC is really the minimum requirement. CR (incluiding Approval) meets WDSC, and also meets FBC.
Brian Olson wrote (Fri.Jan 4):
Of course, even a 1-100 scale can be so "abused". But if 99 people really vote for their favorite with a "1", and the other guy with a "0", aren't they effectively saying "I don't care (much)"?
I reply:
If the range is 0-100, then they're saying they care very little about the election.
You (Brian) continued:
Why should
we be listening to their votes more than they want to be heard?
II reply:
Agreed. They're only voting one point of dilfference in a 100 point range election.
Mike Ossipoff
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