Ralph, you objected to the term "pseudomajority methods" for non-majoritarian single-winner methods, on the grounds that it was too derogatory. So, how about "plurality methods" instead? This is appropriate for methods like approval, range, and Borda, because what matter is who has the highest cumulative score, rather than which candidates are preferred by a majority over which other candidates. In that case, I would update my single-winner classification system as follows:
Criterion 1: If a majority of the electorate coordinates their efforts, they can assure that a given candidate is elected, or that another given candidate is not elected. Criterion 2: Mutual majority criterion Criterion 3: Condorcet efficiency Criterion 4: Minimal dominant set (Smith, GeTChA) efficiency Criterion 1 only: Plurality methods. Criteria 1 and 2 only: Weak majority rule methods / mutual majority methods. Criteria 1, 2, and 3: Intermediate majority rule methods / Condorcet methods Criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4: Strong majority rule methods / strong Condorcet methods / top cycle methods Plurality methods: Plurality, approval, range voting, Borda Mutual majority methods: single-winner STV Condorcet methods: Minimax (aka SD, PC, etc.), Nanson, Black, etc. Strong Condorcet methods: ranked pairs, beatpath, river, cardinal pairwise (assuming that a strong-majority base method is used) Sincerely, James Green-Armytage http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm http://fc.antioch.edu/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/voting.htm ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
