Kevin--
You wrote:
These are Mike Ossipoff's SDSC and WDSC. I prefer the wording I used since it can be applied even when sincere preferences are unknown.)
I reply:
No one's actual preferences need to be known in order to apply WDSC and SDSC. For instance, I've demonstrated here that IRV fails both of those criteria, and that Approval & Condorcet meet WDSC, and that the better Condorcet methods meet SDSC--without making any use of information about the preferences of anyone.
Yes, my defensive strategy criteria refer to preferences, but the writer of a failure example can specify preferences as he chooses, as can the writer of a compliance demonstration. No knowledge of the actual preferences of any actual person is needed.
With Approval, a majority who prefer X to Y can make Y lose without reversing a preference. That's desirable. And no one ever has incentive to vote someone over their favorite. That's desirable too.
I welcome other criteria too, including any by you that accomplish something similar to WDSC & SDSC without mentioning preference.
Mike Ossipoff
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