Folks,
On the old "Technical Evaluation" page of ElectionMethods.org, I had a criterion that I called "summability," which I defined as follows:
"Each vote should map onto a summable array, where the summation operation is associative and commutative, and the winner should be determined from the array sum for all votes cast."
The point was that plurality, Approval, and Condorcet all pass but IRV fails. Well, after further consideration, I realized that IRV actually passes too -- it just needs a much larger "array."
Rather than putting an arbitrary size limit on the array, I decided to take a different approach. Instead of defining a formal "criterion," I simply explained the practical problem with IRV. I spent most of the weekend on the darn thing, but I think it drives a spike through the heart of IRV.
You can see the result at http://ElectionMethods.org/IRVintegrity.htm . Please read it if you get a chance and let me know what you think. Thanks.
--Russ
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