I often post to comment on postings that are about methods that I advocate or strategies that I suggest, especially when someone expresses concerns about those methods or strategies. To not comment would often leave people with a misleading impression gotten from that person�s posting, especially if their posting expressed a lot of confusion about the subject.
I�ve never felt that I should only comment on a posting if the poster likes me or welcomes my comments. I�ve never felt that I shouldn�t comment on someone�s posting just because they might react by going into a rage. I shouldn�t have to make an exception for Russ.
Russ Paielli said:
You make a good point. The fundamental problem, I think, is semantic: the word "strategy" is misleading with regard to voting in an Approval election.
In the context of voting systems, the word "strategy" normally implies insincerity, but there is really no "insincerity" involved in voting in an Approval election.
I comment:
We�ve been all over that. It�s common knowledge on EM that "strategy" is used in a number of different ways. No one but Russ believes that it�s misleading to speak of Approval strategy. In fact he had at his website 4 articles whose titles contained the words "Approval Strategy".
No one has said that strategy must be insincere.
Last summer, summer �04, I posted 2 or 3 definitions of strategy, different ways in which that word is used. The words �strategy� & maybe "definition" are probably in the subject line of that posting.
Strategy often refers to a way of voting, when that way of voting is discussed or evaluated with regard to how good it is for that voter, as regards outcome. That�s the more general definition.
In the name of the Strategy-Free Criterion, I�m using that word differently. I clarified that meaning in my posting last summer. I�m not writing that definition in this posting, but, just as a rough description, strategy, by that definition, involves doing other than truly voting all of one�s preferences, to optimize one�s outcome. Maybe that, itself, would be a good definition. Maybe last summer�s definition referred to the use of information.
So let me summarize these definitions of strategy:
1. A way of voting, when it�s discussed or evaluated with regard to how good it is for the person who votes it, in terms of outcome.
2. The wording of that definition last summer.
3. A way of voting other than voting all of one�s preferences, done to optimize the voter�s outcome.
4. The version of #3 that I posted last summer, which may have referred to the use of information.
[end of list of strategy definitions]
Of course, by #3, all Approval or Plurality voting is strategic, if it�s intended to optimze outcome--likewise voting where ranking-length is limited. Voting a short ranking because of laziness or hurry isn�t strategy by that definition.
Anyway, as I said, no one has said that strategy must be insincere.
Russ said:
The issue of vote optimization in Approval has been analyzed quite thoroughly, but it doesn't address the question of how an Approval election can be manipulated.
I comment:
Presumably this refers to dishonest poll-answering, addressed below.
Russ continued:
As far as I know, however, the issue of pre-election poll-response strategy has barely been scratched.
I comment:
Maybe that�s because polls with verifiabe balloting are pretty much unknown. And without verifiable balloting it would be pontless to discuss dishonest poll-answering. Discussion of such polls is a discussion about something that is rarely, if ever, proposed, much less found.
Russ continued:
As I wrote before, I am only pointing out a potential pitfall. If it turns out that the best poll-response strategy is simply to be honest, then Approval is in great shape.
I comment:
We should all thank Russ for his reassurance. :-)
Russ continues:
Until we know that, however, the "effectiveness" of Approval is unknown.
I comment:
Russ never was very clear about what he means by "effectiveness". If it has to do with problems resulting from the need for polls in which answers and count and reporting are all reliably honest, then, it�s been abundantly pointed out that Approval doesn�t need reliable pre-election polls. Approval voters can use information from previous elections. And they can use any additional information that they have. In the 1st Approval election, they can vote 0-info. That�s "effective" for maximizing expectation, though it isn�t optimal when there�s information on which to base another strategy.
Russ continued:
By the way, I realize that one can always fall back on the "zero-information strategy." That is not a panacea, however, because then the voter is throwing out all information, which may be too drastic in many cases.
I reply:
Russ seems confused about the matter of when 0-info strategy is intended to be used. It�s for when there�s no information on which to base other strategies. No one is throwing out information. One uses 0-info strategy because one doesn�t have the information needed by other strategies.
Russ continued:
Obviously the "zero-information" guidelines are ineffective when only two parties are dominant
I reply:
No, it isn�t a question of "ineffective". When there�s information that could be make other strategies possible, then 0-info strategy is unnecessary. Then, it can be improved upon. But that doesn�t mean that it�s "ineffective". For instance, when it�s perceived that there are 2 parties whose candidates will be the 2 biggest votegetters in the election, then one could benefit from Best Frontrunner, in its various versions, and so 0-info strategy is unnecessary, though not ineffective.
Russ needs to find different mis-statements to post. He�s been repeatedly posting the same ones for a long time now, and it would be an improvement if he�d try different ones.
Mike Ossipoff
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