See below. > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern > Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:47 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package > > On 23 Feb 2005 at 11:42 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> On 23 Feb 2005 at 01:00 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote: > >>>Counting votes: > >>> (wv) seems the appropriate choice. If two voters rank a pair > >>> of candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get > >>> one count. > > Hi Dave, > > Another point occurred to me about counting equal ranking as > a vote each way. > > Besides introducing yet another difference between margins > and winning votes > (in favor of margins!), you also have the question of how you > count unranked > candidates. > > In your proposed method, you place unranked candidates at lowest rank. > > Say there are 9 major candidates, ranked at 1-9 for by 99% of > the voters, and > 100 fringe candidates, unranked except by 1% of the voters. > > Your tally method would require extra votes in 9900 pairwise > matrix locations, > each of the 100 fringe candidates getting one vote against > each of the other > 99. > > Do we really need to confuse the electorate with huge amounts > of extra work > and detail in the pairwise matrix?
The electorate never sees the pairwise matrix. The voter only submits a ranked ballot. I have tried to express (ineloquently) before that we need to axiomatize EM's by keeping vote-collection methods distinct from vote-counting methods. Even in pure Condorcet, a voter is not presented with a pairwise-matrix, since that's a tabulation tool. ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
