For us newcomers, I suggest that Mike and Russ co-author a joint paper
and provide operational definitions of voter strategies (based on
observing voter behaviour), plus criteria, terms and methods, using a an
easy to read programming language, e.g., Modula 3 or Spark Ada, and Mark
act as the editor. What do you think?
Cheers,
Jim
in sunny Tsawwassen, BC
Russ Paielli wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ said:
Some of those criteria were Mike-style criteria and some were normal
criteria. However, looking back at it, I see that we had the Condorcet
criteria defined in terms of true preferences, with the stipulation that
the voters voted "sincerely." Stipulating that the voters vote sincerely
simply eliminates the voting strategy and essentially converts a
Mike-style criterion to a normal criterion.
I reply:
No, the Condorcet's Criterion that was at the website at the
technical evaluation page was a Mike style criterioni entirely. It
referred to the CW (which you called the IDW, defined as I define the
CW), and it stipulated sincere voting. Both the CW and sincere voting
are defined by me in terms of preference, and were defined at your
website in terms of preference.
If you stipulate "sincere" voting, then you are eliminating the voting
strategy and stipulating that the actual votes cast are identical to
the "sincere" or true preferences. In that case, a Mike-style
criterion is equivalent to a standard tally-rules-based criterion.
You can take any standard criterion, play this trick, and call it a
Mike-style criterion. You will only be obfuscating the issue and
adding nothing of any value, however. That's exactly what we did with
the old Condorcet criterion on our former website, and looking back at
it, I realize it was an embarrassment. The Condorcet criterion can and
should be defined in terms of actual votes only.
Russ continues:
But it involves an
unnecessary step that only confuses the matter. In other words, we had a
normal criterion bollocksed up to make it look superficially like a
Mike-style criterion.
I reply:
No, that Condoret's Criterion was thoroughly a Mike style criterion,
for the reasons stated above.
Then "that" Condoret's Criterion wasn't the standard Condorcet
criterion. I could just as well define my own version of monotonicity
too, but what would it accomplish other than making me look like a fool?
<cut>
Russ continues:
Take SFC, the "Strategy-Free Criterion":
"If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a majority
prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
any preferences."
I reply:
That's your wording, corrected by me so that it retains the meaning
that I intended. But let me state it my way:
If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
Actually, I think Approval passes this criterion. If that majority
draw their cutoff between X and Y, then Y can't win.
I realize that some criteria are defined for ranking methods only, but
I clearly recall that Mike intended for his criteria to apply to all
methods (as implied by the compliance table at the top of the old
"Technical Evaluation" page).
The question is then whether rating candidates equally in Approval
constitutes a "sincere" vote when the voter doesn't really consider
them equal. If not, that needs to explicitly specified as part of the
criterion definition, because it is certainly *not* obvious. Since
that was not explicitly stated, I say Approval passes SFC as stated
above.
<cut>
Russ continues:
Now, what does this
Mike-style criterion tell us? It tells us that a majority can use a
strategy to thwart a minority.
I reply:
We're finding out that Russ hadn't a clue about the meaning of the
criteria that were at his website.
Provided that no one falsifies a preference,
B loses without the CW>B voters doing other than voting sincerely. I
don't call that a use of strategy by the CW>B voters. The point of
the criterion is that, with complying methods, under the criterion's
premise conditions, that majority needn't do other than vote
sincerely, to make Y lose.
Russ continues:
So why, then, is it called the
"Strategy-Free" criterion? It is called that because the strategy
doesn't require any reversal of true preferences. But it *does* involve
insincere truncation strategy
I reply:
Not at all. Russ just stated the criterion, and it didn't say that
the members of that majority could keep Y from winning if that
majority truncated. It said that if no one falsifies a preference,
and if the majority who prefer the CW to Y vote sincerely, then Y
won't win, with a complying method. The CW>Y voters needn't do other
than rank sincerely. That's why it's called the Strategy-Free criterion.
Actually, Mike is right about that. I just re-read the criterion, and
it doesn't involve truncation by the majority. I guess that justifies
the insults, eh?
Maybe Mike will wake up some day and realize that he started the
insults, and he perpetuates them. I will be happy to stop insulting
Mike as soon as he stops insulting me and learns how to disagree
respectfully. Until that time (or until I get off this email list), I
will continue to expose him as the pedantic amateur he is. He badly
needs to learn a lesson about professionalism even if he is an amateur.
Russ continues:
, which the criterion itself does not
state. So the criterion name itself is misleading.
I replyi:
Russ has mislead himself by being unable to read what he's just copied.
Another insult.
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
