Ted�s message, which I copy below, expresses the reason why we need a better voting system. And it also should serve as a guide to what properties that better voting system should have.
I�ve been saying that my purpose with voting system reform is to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, or, to say it more generally, to minimize the need for defensive strategy that conceals voters�preferences.
That�s what we need a better voting system for.
That�s the standard that my criteria are intended to measure for, and that�s the standard for which I chose the methods that I advocate: Approval, CR, wv Condorcet.
Some would prefer criteria that don�t say "prefer". Sure, some could argue that there�s something nice about writing a criterion that only refers to votes--if such a criterion is enough. The problem is that no-prefernce, votes-only criteria tend to have some ridiculous problems. So, if you think my preference criteria are somehow unaesthetic, I answer that the ridiculous problems of the votes-only criteria are worse.
Those problems include:
1. Having a Condorcet�s Criterion that Plurality passes.
2. Stipulating that the criterion applies only to rank methods, or that it doesn�t apply to Plurality
3. Saying that any method that isn�t a rank method fails the criterion.
Solutions 2 & 3 are rules-criteria, criteria that refer to a method�s rules in its premise or its requirement.
Take your pick, if you want to not have "preference" in the definition of Condorcet�s Criterion. I�m not claiming that those solutions would even work with my defensive strategy criteria.
I emhasize that, contrary to what Markus claims, my defensive strategy criteria are defned, and are well-defined, by any reasonable defintiion of those terms. There�s no ambiguity or vagueness in their definitions,and there�s no situation in which it can�t be clearly and definitely said, without disagreement, whether a method passes one of those criteria or fails it.
I also emphasizes that I�m not trying to say that there shouldn�t be any other criteria for the goal that I stated. Of course I welcome anyone else to write other lesser-of-2-evils criteria, or defensive strategy criteria, criteria intended to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, the need for drastic defensive strategy, which makes millions of voters afraid to express what they actually want.
So, if someone doesn�t like my defensive strategy criteria, I encourage them to write their own.
But if someone wants to say that my defensive strategy criteria aren�t defined, then I invite the to post a situation in which at least one of my criteria doesn�t give an unambiguous answer about whether some method passes or fails.
Mike Ossipoff
Ted�s message:
An interesting item I just read:
http://instapundit.com/archives/021490.php
"This illustrates, in a mild way, the reason why totalitarian
regimes collapse so suddenly. . . . Such regimes have little
legitimacy, but they spend a lot of effort making sure that
citizens don't realize the extent to which their fellow-citizens
dislike the regime. If the secret police and the censors are
doing their job, 99% of the populace can hate the regime and be
ready to revolt against it - but no revolt will occur because no
one realizes that everyone else feels the same way."Originally he was talking about flags up 6 months after 9/11. Now he's talking about Lebanon and Syria.
But the real point to take home is why people on this list should be working for voting method reform -- the true preferences of the people are not fully expressed. When people have the opportunity to express their true preferences and see what others are expressing, tremendous positive change can result.
I would add that polls are insufficient for communicating the prevailing sentiment of the general populace.
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