Daniel,
--- Daniel Bishop <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a �crit�:
> >So, what do you make of my favorite scenario?:
> >
> >49 A
> >24 B
> >27 C>B
> >
> Consider the ballots:
>
> 49 A
> 24 B
> 24 C>B
>
> In summary,
>
> * Electing A is equivalent to discarding 3 ballots
> * Electing B is equivalent to discarding 7 ballots
> * Electing C is equivalent to discarding 23 ballots
>
> Based on this argument, A should be elected.
I think it would be better to disregard the noise candidate, C, than to
discard ballots and reverse the only majority opinion we got.
Electing A will give voters the impression that they can't vote for a
sincere favorite, out of fear that they will sink their compromise choice.
> I know you're asking, "What if the sincere preferences were 49 A>B>C +
> 24 B>C>A + 27 C>B>A? Then B would be the sincere Condorcet winner."
> But if this were the case, then the B>C>A voters would have been better
> off voting sincerely. So why didn't they?
Actually, I don't care how the A>B>C voters vote. It is obvious that they
shouldn't vote A>B>C. So suppose the B voters vote B>C>A? Then both Margins
and WV would elect C. So it's not exactly safe for them to vote that way.
They are probably counting on your threat that A will be elected, to convince
the C voters to just vote "B."
Kevin Venzke
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