Russ Paielli wrote:
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Russ asked about what we used to call "Approval Completed Condorcet."
The legendary Demorep was an avid proponent of several variations of this idea, one of which he christened ACMA for Approval, Condorcet, Maximum Approval, a three step method:
Step 1: Approval: first eliminate all candidates with more disapproval than approval.
Step 2: Condorcet: elect the Condorcet Winner among the remaining candidates if there is one.
Step 3: Maximum Approval: in the case of no CW in step 2, elect the candidate with maximum approval.
The first step is arbitrary and I would eliminate it.
I would start by simply choosing the CW if one exists, or paring the field down to the Smith set otherwise. Then I would eliminate the candidate with the lowest approval and repeat.
I thought of this yesterday while I was working out, and I thought I had come up with something big. Then I searched the EM archives and discovered that Kevin Venzke had mentioned it way back in 2003.
Oh, by the way, I would *not* allow equal rankings. Why not? I just don't like them.
Not a very convincing reason to me.
They strike me as an unnecessary complication
How are they a complication? If anything, equal rankings make it *easier* to construct a pairwise matrix.
and little more than a way to game the system.
There's a potentially important practical advantage, in that it allows voters to cast a Cardinal Rankings-style ballot. For example, you could let:
Rank 1 = ideal candidate
Rank 2 = candidate I have minor disagreements with
Rank 3 = candidate I have major disagreements with
Rank 4 = candidate I wouldn't vote for even if he were running against Hitler and Stalin
If there are a large number of candidates, this could be considerably easier for the voter than casting a fully-ranked ballot.
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