Hallo, Woodall's papers can be found here:
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE6/P4.HTM Woodall writes in his 1994 paper: > Plurality: If some candidate x has strictly fewer votes > in total than some other candidate y has first-preference > votes, then x should not have greater probability than y > of being elected. > > (...) > > Election 3 > ab 11 > b 7 > c 12 > > (...) > > It seems that most of the Condorcet-based properties > discussed in the Social Choice literature would in fact > elect a in Election 3, and so violate plurality (whereas > AV elects c and DAC elects b). How seriously one regards > the failure of plurality depends on how one interprets > truncated preference listings, and that in turn may > depend on the rubric on the ballot paper. If the 12 c > voters are merely expressing indifference between a and b > and not hostility to them, and so can be treated in > exactly the same way as if half of them voted cab and half > voted cba, then the violation is not too serious. But if, > by plumping for c, these voters are not just saying that > they prefer c to a, but that they want c and definitely > do not want a (or b), and if the seven b voters also > definitely do not want a (or c), then it is clear that c > has more support than a and so a should not be elected. In my recent mails, I wrote that Mike Ossipoff's concept of "majority rejected" candidates cannot be used for other election methods than MinMax. I also consider his concept of "offensive" and "defensive" strategies not promising. On the other side, Woodall's plurality criterion is a criterion that can also be applied to other election methods than MinMax. For example, also Schulze(winning votes) and Tideman(winning votes) satisfy Woodall's plurality criterion. Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
