Dear Kevin! you wrote: > By the way, I think Later-no-harm is very important, in order to coax > information out of the voters, and avoid de facto Clone-Winner > failures.
I agree with the first, that's why I try to find a compromise between LNH and Condorcet. But what do you mean by "de facto Clone-Winner failures"? > I'm still digesting your suggestion. I believe Later-no-harm is > normally stricter than this, though: No candidate ranked above the > new preference is allowed to suffer a decrease in the probability of > being elected, even if that probability moves upwards in the voter's > ranking. Yes, Woodall's definition for the non-deterministic case is different. I was only saying that for deterministic situations both agree! > But I don't think loosening this criterion would help much, since > normally if adding a preference can affect other candidates' odds of > election, you don't know whether these candidates are ranked above or > below the new preference. Sorry, I don't understand this one... Anyway, I think my loosening of LNH is indeed of help: It is consistent with Condorcet, whereas LNH is not. > A Condorcet winner always makes it into the CDTT set, incidentally. I > think that's good enough for me. If I understand CDTT right, it is equal to the Smith set, at least when no pairwise ties occurr, am I right? So what you suggested a few posts earlier was to use "Random Ballot on the Smith Set", right? Well, I think that would be more randomization than needed. I would prefer to restrict the choice to uncovered candidates, by using one of the Chain Climbing methods from yesterday, for example. What do you think about them? Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
