Dear James Green-Armytage, > Thank you Markus; that's good to know. However, I don't regard > monotonicity to be an extremely important criterion.
However, I see the following problem: When someone promotes a Condorcet method that violates monotonicity, then he cannot use IRV's violation of this criterion as an argument against IRV. ********* > I'm wondering: could you show an example with no pairwise ties > where SD and beatpath give different results? In situation 2 of my 12 July 2000 mail, beatpath chooses candidate F while sequential dropping chooses candidate D. You can fill the remaining pairwise defeats with arbitrarily chosen numbers. Then this example could look e.g. as follows: AB 21 BC 17 CD 15 DE 13 EF 18 FG 19 GA 14 DB 16 GE 20 AC 1 AD 2 AE 3 AF 4 BE 5 BF 6 BG 7 CE 8 CF 9 CG 10 DF 11 DG 12 Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
