Mike, Beginning with a quote from me, you wrote (Fri.Mar.18): "'I object far more to the "equal-rank near the top" incentive that exists for some voters (including "zero-info." voters) in equal-ranking allowed Winning Votes defeat-dropper.'
I reply: Remember that it's been shown that every nonrandom method gives some kind of incentive for strategic voting." CB: Yes, but not in the zero-info. case. I don't think that DD(WV)'s 0-info. incentives combined with its vulnerability to Burying and defection is the best bargain. I'll be elaborating more on alternatives in a later post. "The equal-ranking incentive that you describe is gotten rid of by AERLO." I am strongly of the view that as far as possible, the result of the election should be determined purely by the voters, who are nominally (or "in theory") voting sincerely. Therefore I'm opposed to explicit strategy devices, "candidate withdrawal options", candidate proxy, and reliance (before-absolutely-unavoidable)on random devices. "Still, it would be a nice luxury for everyone to have no incentive to do other than sincerely rank those better-set candidates." I am sure that SCRIRVE, and doubtless some other methods, fill that bill. I think the "Definite Majority Choice" idea recently floated here of having the voters enter an approval cutoff in their rankings and then the method eliminates all candidates who are pairwise beaten by more approved candidates; is promising. Continuing from the previous quote: "AERLO ensures that. That isn't the only value of AERLO. It, along with ATLO, also is a way to make order-reversal-deterrence easier." I am not really a huge fan of "deterrent strategy". Chris Benham Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies. http://au.movies.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
