Dear Chris and James! James answered to Chris: >> 46 abc >> 44 bca (sincere is bac) >> 05 cab >> 05 cba >> >> So the obvious question I ask you is this: Why then do you >> reccomend methods that elect B? > > Do I? First of all, my recommendation of winning votes methods is > tenuous. Second, I suggest that this would be an unrealistic winning > votes example, because I expect that in a real wv election of this > type, most of the A>B>C voters would truncate before B, and most of > the B voters would truncate before A. My primary single-winner > recommendation is cardinal pairwise (CWP). I find it highly unlikely > that CWP would pick any candidate other than A in this example.
I would like to note that also in "Random Ballot among the not strongly defeated candidates", the election will probably end up electing a: With sincere votes 46 a>>b>c 44 b>>a>c 05 c>>a>b 05 c>>b>a or 46 a>>b>c 44 b>>a>c 05 c>a>>b 05 c>b>>a, a is both Condorcet and Approval winner. When the b voters only order-reverse, 44 b>>c>a, the pairwise defeats say a>b>c>a, but approval still says a>b>c, hence b and c are still strongly defeated and cannot win. Only if the b voters even lift c above their approval cutoff, 44 b>c>>a, the situation changes to approval c>a>b, so that now a and b are strongly defeated and c wins, which is of no help for the b voters. Comments? Yours, Jobst ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
