Operating from the following assumptions:
1) There is never a viable reason to select a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner if a CW exists
2) Any voting criterion that is inherently incompatible with electing a Condorcet Winner should be discarded
3) All Condorcet "tiebreakers" pass some criteria and fail others
I am just curious if there is a *set* of Condorcet methods, such that all popular criteria are met by at least one of the methods.
Then the population could be told that the election will select a Condorcet Winner if one exists, and if not, one of the tiebreaking methods would be selected randomly. It would be better if they all met the Smith or Schwartz criteria.
It remove the motivation for targetted tactical voting if there was always a chance the tactical voting would backfire.
Sorry if this has been discussed, I can't even begin to read every message on this list. :-)
---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
