James, I like this suggestion: > Strong/weak preference option (S/WPO): Voters can express both strong and weak preferences. The direction of pairwise defeats are determined by both strong and weak preferences, and the strength of pairwise defeats are determined only by strong preferences. Comments: Slightly more flexible variant on AERLO/ATLO.
I think this was proposed a long time ago by Steve Eppley. In principle I like it, because it isn't an *explicit* strategy device. It just asks the voters for more specific preference information, without inviting the voters to strategize or expecting them to know or care what a "majority rule cycle" is. So I don't think your comment does it justice. You wrote: > Dear election methods fans, Here is a brief list of measures that have been proposed so far with the aim of curtailing Condorcet's vulnerability to the burying strategy. I invite all participants to remind me of other proposals that fit in this category, and to propose new methods with the same goal. Approval Margins is highly resistant to Burying, and in my view is not qualitatively worse in this respect than Approval-Weighted Pairwise. Chris Benham Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies. http://au.movies.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
