On 4 Apr 2005 at 06:08 UTC-0700, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > Dear Curt! > > You wrote: >> 1) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the >> Schwartz set to be the proper winner? >> 2) Are there cases where you would consider a candidate outside the >> Smith set to be the proper winner? > > Yes, definitely: When x,y,z<n/2, then in the sincere situation > x A>>D>B>C > y B>>D>C>A > z C>>D>A>B > the winner should be one of A,B,C, with probability x/n, y/n, z/n, > respectively, since D is not approved by anyone. > > DFC (Democratic Fair Choice) gives this result!
[Later corrected to allow a small probability for D] Hi Jobst, I don't see anything wrong with choosing a 100% central candidate with 0% approval. In fact, I think it is the most desirable outcome in your example. But then, I'm from the school of thought that when there is no popular consensus on how to govern, it's better for the government to be as weak as possible. ;-) Ted -- araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
