Russ, You wrote (Tue.Apr.12): "I just realized that two Condorcet-Approval hybrid methods that I had thought were distinct are actually equivalent. This may have been pointed out already, and it may even be obvious to some, but it was a significant realization to me nonetheless. (If it *has* been pointed out, please don't hesitate to tell me where.)
Method 1: The winner is the most-approved member of the Smith set. Method 2: If no CW exists, repeatedly drop the least-approved candidate until a CW is found." CB: An example in an Adam Tarr (April,2002) post demonstrates that you are mistaken: 49: Bush>>Nader>Gore 6: Gore>Bush>>Nader 6: Gore>>Bush>Nader 6: Gore>>Nader>Bush 6: Gore>Nader>>Bush 27: Nader>Gore>>Bush Bush>Nader>Gore>Bush, so all the candidates are in the Smith set. Approval scores: Bush 55, Gore 51, Nader 33. Your "method 1" above elects Bush, while "method 2" elects Gore. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html Chris Benham Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies. http://au.movies.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
