James--
First, to answer your question in your subject line, "What are we arguing about?", I can't really say that I understand the question, if you're asking that I name a disagreement other than those that have been so thoroughly expressed in the postings.
But my description of the discussion is this:
You say that vulnerability to strategy is an important strategy consideration, and that wv adds a whole new wrong that Plurality and IRV doesn't have, because wv is "vulnerable to burying". You repeated that many times, even after I answered it.
I say that emphasis on vulnerability to strategy is missing the point and barking up the wrong tree. That's because offensive strategy or what you call "burying" is only part of a mechanism which is one way of causing certain undesirable results that can happen with any method. You don't want me to repeat it all again, do you? It's repeated in all my postings in the discussion. Well, I'll repeat part of it:
Let's talk of these undesirable results: Failure to elect a CW, and violation of majorilty wishes (which I"ve defined on EM recently). Those things are what I mean by "undesirable results".
All methods can have undesirable results. Because different methods have different balloting rules and/or different count rules, they can have their undesirable results by different mechanisms, and they can have them in different examples.
That leads you to say that wv has a problem that IRV doesn't have: vulnerability to "burying", because what you call "burying" is what can cause the undesirable results to happen in wv.
I say that if the undesirable results happen, if a CW loses, or majority wishes are violated, that's still the same undesirable results, regardless of what method did it, and regardless of what the mechanism is. You call it a new "problem", but I call it the same undesirable result.
I've told of two differences between those undesirable results in Plurality or IRV, and in wv:
1. In IRV or wv they happen automatically, without anyone using strategy, while in wv they're the result of offensive order-reversal.
2. In IRV or wv they can be prevented only by favoritei-burial, while in wv and Approval they can be prevented by mere equal-voting. And in wv the offensive strategy that causes the undesirable results can be deterred by truncation.
Therefore, I say that it's meaningless to say that wv brings a new problem. The loss of a CW, or the violation of majority wishes, is the same undesirable result in wv as in Pluralitly or IRV, but in wv it takes much more to make it happen, and it takes less to protect against it.
In a recent posting, you repeated 4 or 5 times that IRV isn't vulnerable to "burying" or strategic manipulation. Sure, I understood that you get that language from your professors, or their articles, but I suggest that you not uncritically copy your professors.
Some take the even more ridiculous position that Plurality is "susceptible" or "vulnerable" to strategy because it lets Nader-preferrers defeat Bush by voting for Kerry instead of Nader. That's a completely backwards description, because the problem isn't that Plurality is vulnerable to that voting. The problem is that those voters need to do that. (Of course, if Plurality were somehow not susceptible to favorite-burial strategy, I'd like that fine. But the real problem is that voters need to do that, not that they can).
You say:
In our current discussion of voter strategy, we seem to be talking largely at cross-purposes. You accuse me of ignoring points of yours which I have actually read and tried to take into account in my reply.
I reply:
It was necessary for me to repeat the same things again and again, to answer the same repeated statements of yours. If you'd noticed what I'd said, you didn't show any sign of it.
You continue:
I suggest
that we will have a more productive discussion if we first clarify what
are the major points that we are trying to make.
So, I request that you _briefly_ answer the following questions:1. What is the main point that you are trying to demonstrate?
I reply:
You said "briefly", so I'll try to summarize it briefly. The complete version is repeated a number of times in my recent replies to you in this discussion, and most of it is repeated again in the beginning of this posting. So now I'll just briefly summarize, as you suggested:
Talk of methods' vulnerability to strategy is completely missing the point, in regards to what a strategy problem is. A strategy problem consists of a need for defensive strategy. That's the important thing, from the voter's point of view, and it's what my criteria try to minimize.
I also define "undesirable results", and point out that when they happen, they're just as undesirable regardless of the mechanism that led to those results. But some methods are better than others in regards to what it takes to make those undesirable results happen, and what it takes to protect against them.
That concludes my brief summary.
You continue:
2. What do you think is the main point that I am trying to demonstrate?
I reply:
Shouldn't you be the one to summarize that?
When you do, feel free to tell me exactly what statements of mine you disagree with, and why, if there are any statements of mine that you want to disagree with on EM.
Mike Ossipoff
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