Paul said:
Mike, if you haven't read the paper, don't complain that you don't know what Arrow meant by IIAC.
I reply:
...but when did I complain because I don't know what Arrow meant by IIAC? I couldn't care less what Arrow meant by IIAC.
Paul continues:
If you think IIAC is unimportant, fine. Then quit with all the "strategy" complications, since those are heavily dependent upon the degree to which a method complies or doesn't comply with IIAC.
I reply:
Is that why Plurality passes IIAC (by its only definition that's been posted to EM) and the best Condorcet versions fail IIAC? :-)
And how many are the "degree[s] to which a method complies or doesn't comply with IIAC"?
Paul wants to say that IIAC is _the_ strategy criterion. We apparently must take that on Paul's authority.
And, when Paul says that IIAC is the important strategy criterion, exactly what IIAC definition is he referring toi? My votes-only one that I've recently posted? If not, then how does Paul define IIAC?
And yes, even without reading Arrow's paper, I do suggest that you should tell us what you mean by IIAC, if you're going to claim that it's ain important strategy definition.
If Paul will forgive me, my strategy concerns are about the need to bury favorites, and other drastic preference-concealing strategies needed by majorities, under conditions wherin it can be guaranteed, by better methods, that they won't need such strategies.
Mike Ossipoff
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