Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Chris Benham chrisbenham-at-bigpond.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
I agree with Kevin V.'s last post in this thread. You wrote:
The same considerations apply to the "top-two Approval pairwise
runoff" method I suggested a few days ago. If the "turkey raisers" or
cloners succeed, they have simply forced an effective reversion to
basic Approval.
In terms of strategy and possible results, no, because in "basic
Approval" no-one has any incentive to vote for a "turkey". Assuming
the "turkey raisers" would prefer to elect a turkey
rather than one of the candidates from the rival faction of
turkey-raisers, then they have two levels of success: (1) to prevent
the election of a candidate from there rival faction of
turkey-raisers, and (2) to elect one of their own candidates. It is
possible that the net effect of the turkey-raising is that the final
runoff will be between two turkeys, a complete
fiasco.
Also it is unfair that parties with the resources to run two
candidates should have an (extra) advantage (in terms of the voting
system maths) over parties who can only afford to run one.
I agree. The same consideration applies to two-round runoff, of course,
which is in widespread use.
Wrong again, Russ, you ******* *****. It doesn't apply to two-round
runoff because voters are not allowed to approve multiple candidates.
--Russ
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