At 06:12 PM 6/14/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
What I meant was this: When a voter expressed that s/he prefers A to B, we interpret this to mean that if s/he could choose between A and B, she would choose A. Now what do we think the voter would choose when s/he put A and B at equal ranks? Do we assume that s/he would delegate the decision by, say, asking a friend to decide, or do we assume that she would throw a coin?
There is quite another possibility, and it seems to me that it is a counterexample to Mr. Heitzig's presumptions about strategic or "insincere" voting.
The voter may prefer A but consider B acceptable and may also know that the election system does not allow an expression of what could be called a minor preference but only general preference or equality. The voter may prefer that B win than that A win leaving B voters dissatisfied with the result. In other words, the voter may prefer consensus to the victory of personal preference.
I've been stumping for simply allowing overvotes with standard plurality elections, a reversal of normal practice in the U.S. which implements, quite simply, Approval. The effect of this with IRV is to hybridize IRV, allowing the expression of equal preference by simply voting for both candidates at a given level of preference.
The result apparently would be to leave the choice with the voter of whether or not to vote preference or equality. This is not at all insincere, rather, it can be an expression of a more subtle sincerity than raw preference.
(But "sincerity" is used technically, it seems, to describe any voting that is not strictly in accordance with candidate preference, as distinct from *social* preference. This is another example of how the technical language of the EM community can be deceptive or confusing to the general public when information from the community is taken to the public, as it will be. I'm not suggesting, necessarily, that the community change its language but rather that it become more explicit that the usage is technical, and, where possible, to specify deviations from general usage.)
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