Kevin Venzke stepjak-at-yahoo.fr |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
I was quite wrong about MMPO being unable to elect the Condorcet Loser unless
all candidates have a majority-strength loss. As an example,
48 A
2 B=A
2 B=C
48 C
MMPO elects B decisively. So MMPO fails Plurality even worse than I thought.
I don't know how I forgot this; two-slot MMPO was the first method I advocated
on this list, and I knew it had this problem then.
Kevin,
Let me just add one more point, which may be obvious. I had a hunch that
some some strange results could occur with MMPO. Why? Because it chooses
the winner based solely on the number of votes *against* each candidate.
It does not even consider the number of votes *for* the candidates.
Something seemed seriously out of balance. Hence the case you cite
above, in which a candidate wins with only 4 non-last-place votes out of
100 votes. Oh well, it was fun while it lasted!
--Russ
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