Forest,
--- "Simmons, Forest " <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Suppose that you modify MDDA by specifying a three slot, MCA style ballot,
> i.e. allowing voters
> to rank as many alternatives as they like in first and second place, but all
> other candidates
> are considered equally ranked and unapproved.
>
> Call the resulting method MDDA3.
>
> It seems to me that MDDA3 satisfies Clone-Winner, because you have to cram
> cloned alternatives
> into at most two slots per ballot, which makes it impossible to have a 51%
> majority cycle in a
> clone set.
That's interesting. I like three-slot ballots, and would probably suggest them
with
MDDA (even if there were no criteria benefit). The only thing is that it seems
easier to argue that limited slot methods fail clone independence. So for that
reason
I was considering methods allowing strict ranking.
> I would prefer what I we might call "67%MDDA3" where the disqualifications
> are made by
> two-thirds majorities, and the ballots are three slot style.
I'm not so fond of this, because I want to satisfy voted Majority Favorite.
By the way, the motivation for having disqualifications was mainly to satisfy
SFC.
They aren't needed to satisfy FBC or SDSC. So perhaps something more
sophisticated
than disqualifications is possible on three-slot ballots.
> In summary, the compliances Kevin asked about seem to be compatible, but
> perhaps not in the way
> that he was hoping for.
Heh. I am glad you brought this up.
Kevin Venzke
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