These judgements are just my own opinion.
Why I wouldn't trade SFC for ICC:
Premise requirements, from the voter's point of view:
SFC applies to you if you're in a majority of voters who prefer the CW to
someone, Y, whom you want to keep from winning, and if no one falsifies a
preference (or at least if the number doing so isn't great enough to change
the election outcome).
ICC applies only if everyone votes sincerely, which, in a rank method, means
that everyone ranks all of the candidates.
SFC's applicability requirements sound more plausible.
Guarantees:
SFC guarantees that you won't have to do other than rank sincerely, in order
to make Y lose.
ICC guarantees that your faction can run as many or as few identical
candidates as they want to, without affecting their faction's chances.
SFC's guarantee appeals to me more.
But both criteria depend, for their applicability to a situation, on facts
beyond the individual voter, facts that might not be knowable to the voter.
I don't object to trading SFC compliance for compliance with a better
criterion. In interested in how much better a method can be devised by such
trades. The only criterion that I wouldn't be willing to trade away is FBC.
Now I understand what Kevin meant when he objected to the difficulty of
applying FBC. The votes-only FBC that we've been discussing is definitely
more easily applied.
It seems to me that there was reason to believe that they're equivalent for
monotonic methods, but I don't want to say that for sure.
For use with the public, of course the preference FBC, the original version,
is useful, because it's so oibvious, intuitive and briefly-stated. For
actually testing methods, the votes-only FBC is more useful.
The votes-only FBC seems to be the top-end counterpart to LNHarm and LNHelp.
Probably the only attainable top end counterpart to those criteria. But if
they have other attainable top-end counterparts, that would be an
interesting and important thing to find out.
So, in that way, votes-only FBC fits into a larger system of criteria.
CR, MMPO, and MDDA are all equivalent to Approval in an
acceptable/unacceptable situation when the voter votes optimally (with power
truncation available in MMPO & MDDA). Is that a general fact, that all
FBC-complying methods are equivalent to Approval under those conditions, or
are there exceptions?
Though I'd like to keep SFC, and the freedom to vote all preferences, the
3-slot limitation would be acceptable if it can bring compliance with a more
important criterion.
Kevin spoke of replacing disqualification with something more sophisticated.
I hope that wouldn't mean more complicated, because that would spoil it as a
public proposal. The beauty of Approval, CR, MMPO and MDDA is their
simplicity, in addition to their FBC compliance.
Mike Ossipoff
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